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Abstract
We introduce a new class of protocols called Proofs of Work or Knowledge (PoWorKs). In a
PoWorK, a prover can convince a verifier that she has either performed work or that she possesses
knowledge of a witness to a public statement without the verifier being able to distinguish which
of the two has taken place. We formalize PoWorK in terms of three properties, completeness,
f -soundness and indistinguishability (where f is a function that determines the tightness of the
proof of work aspect) and present a construction that transforms 3-move HVZK protocols into
3-move public-coin PoWorKs. To formalize the work aspect in a PoWorK protocol we define
cryptographic puzzles that adhere to certain uniformity conditions, which may also be of inde-
pendent interest. We instantiate our puzzles in the random oracle (RO) model as well as via
constructing “dense” versions of suitably hard one-way functions.
We then showcase PoWorK protocols by presenting a number of applications. We first show
how non-interactive PoWorKs can be used to reduce spam email by forcing users sending an
e-mail to either prove to the mail server they are approved contacts of the recipient or to per-
form computational work. As opposed to previous approaches that applied proofs of work to
this problem, our proposal of using PoWorKs is privacy-preserving as it hides the list of the re-
ceiver’s approved contacts from the mail server. Our second application, shows how PoWorK
can be used to compose cryptocurrencies that are based on proofs of work (“Bitcoin-like”) with
cryptocurrencies that are based on knowledge relations (these include cryptocurrencies that are
based on “proof of stake”, and others). The resulting PoWorK-based cryptocurrency inherits the
robustness properties of the underlying two systems while PoWorK-indistinguishability ensures
a uniform population of miners. Finally, we show that PoWorK protocols imply straight-line
quasi-polynomial simulatable arguments of knowledge and based on our construction we obtain
an efficient straight-line concurrent 3-move statistically quasi-polynomial simulatable argument
of knowledge.
Keywords: proof of work, cryptographic puzzle, concurrent zero-knowledge, dense one-way
functions, cryptocurrencies.
*Part of the work performed while at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Research supported by ERC
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1 Introduction
We introduce a new class of prover verifier protocols where the prover wishes to convince the verifier
that it is either in possession of a witness to a publicly known statement or that it has invested a
certain amount of computational effort. A Proof of Work or Knowledge (PoWorK) enables the prover
to achieve this objective while at the same time ensuring that the verifier is incapable of distinguishing
which way the prover has followed : performing the work or exploiting her knowledge of the witness.
At an intuitive level a PoWorK protocol is a disjunction of a proof of work and a proof of knowl-
edge. Proofs of knowledge are a fundamental notion in cryptography [GMR85] with a very wide array
of applications in the design of cryptographic protocols. They have been studied extensively, both in
terms of efficient constructions, e.g., [Sch89], as well as in terms of their composability with them-
selves or within larger protocols, see e.g., [CDS94, DNS98, CGGM00, Can01, CF01, Pas03, Pas04].
Proofs of work on the other hand, were first introduced in [DN92], further studied in [RSW96, Bac97,
JB99, DGN03, CMSW09], and were primarily applied as a denial of service network or spam pro-
tection mechanism; recently they have also found important applications in building decentralized
cryptocurrencies (notably Bitcoin [Nak08] but also many others).
In an interactive proof protocol, we are interested primarily in two basic properties, soundness and
zero-knowledge, that represent the adversarial objectives of the prover and the verifier respectively:
the prover must not be able to convince the verifier of false statements while the verifier should not
extract any knowledge from interacting with the prover beyond what can be inferred by the public
statement. An important class of prover verifier protocols is the 3-move honest-verifier zero knowl-
edge (HVZK) protocols. They are three-move protocols that are “public-coin”, i.e., the verifier in
the second move merely selects a random value (that is drawn independently to the statement of
the prover’s first move) and submits it to the prover. 3-move HVZK protocols capture a very wide
class of practical proofs of knowledge (including Schnorr’s identification scheme [Sch89]) but also
all languages in NP can be shown with a (computational) HVZK protocol via reduction to e.g., the
Hamilton cycle protocol [Blu87]. The class of ⌃-protocols possesses very useful properties including
being closed under conjunction and disjunction operations [CDS94].
Given the above, one may construct a PoWorK protocol for a language L as follows: the verifier
samples a cryptographic puzzle, puz, and submits it to the prover. The prover provides a commitment
 and shows that she either possesses a witnessw showing that the statement x belongs toL or that the
commitment  contains a solution to puz. It is easy to prove that this is a general four-move protocol
that implements a PoWorK for any language L and any cryptographic puzzle. On the other hand, it
is known that for zero-knowledge proofs, two-round protocols do not exist for non-trivial languages
[GO94] and this result remains true even if the zero-knowledge property is relaxed to O( log
c( ))-
simulatability [Pas03], in the sense that only languages decidable in quasi-polynomial time may have
two-round quasi-polynomial-time simulatable protocols.
1.1 Our results.
We define and construct efficient three-move PoWorK protocols as well as relevant cryptographic
puzzles. Morerover, we demonstrate how PoWorK can instantiate systems that reduce email spam
while preserving user privacy, how they are useful in composition of cryptocurrency systems and
how they can give rise to concurrent simulatable protocols. In more details:
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1.1.1 Definition of PoWorKs.
Our formalization entails two definitions, f -soundness and (statistical) indistinguishability. In f -
soundness we require that any prover that has running time (in number of steps) less than a specified
parameter calibrated according to the function f of the running time of the puzzle solver, it is guaran-
teed to lead to a knowledge extractor. The importance of the function f is to provide a safe running
time upper bound under which the complete protocol execution is successful only via an (a-priori)
knowledge of the witness. Indistinguishability on the other hand, ensures that a malicious verifier is
incapable of discerning whether the prover performs the proof of work or possesses the knowledge
of the witness. We note that timing issues are not taken into account in our model (i.e., we assume
that the prover always takes the same amount of time to finish no matter which one of the two strate-
gies it follows). What we do care about though, is that the prover who performs a proof of work
spends at least a certain amount of computational resources. Note that indistinguishability easily im-
plies witness indistinguishability [FS90], and thus any PoWorK is also a witness indistinguishable
protocol.
1.1.2 PoWorK Constructions.
We present a three-move public-coin protocol instantiating a PoWorK given any 3-move HVZK pro-
tocol with special soundness. Our protocol transformation preserves the structure and round com-
plexity of the given 3-move HVZK protocol. Observe that the verifier cannot simply provide a puz-
zle challenge since this would violate the public-coin characteristic of the protocol. To achieve our
construction we require puzzle generation algorithms that have a suitable uniformity characteristics,
specifically, we require that the domain of puzzles (the “puzzle space”) and the challenge space of
the 3-move HVZK protocol are statistically very close (in terms of the distributions induced by the
puzzle sample algorithm and the verifier in the protocol). Given such suitable puzzle distribution we
present a protocol where the prover is capable of generating a puzzle solution on the fly (utilizing
the verifier’s public coins) and solve it, if she wishes. To establish the practicality of our approach
we also construct puzzles that are “dense” within {0, 1}l and hence consistent with the challenge
space of many natural 3-move HVZK protocols. Our dense puzzle based PoWorK construction has
the characteristic that is black-box with respect to the underlying puzzle system (which is suitable for
puzzles whose security is argued, say, in the RO model).
1.1.3 Definition and instantiations of puzzles.
We give formal definitions of cryptographic puzzle systems PuzSys that are easy to generate, hard
to solve, and easy to verify. We define additional properties like density and amortization resistance
and we give two instantiations. Our first instantiation utilizes the random oracle model [BR93] while
the second relies on complexity assumptions. More specifically, we use Universal One Way Hash
Function families (UOWHF) [NY89] to build extractors with special properties, invoking a variant
of leftover hash lemma [Dod05]. We then combine this special extractor with suitably hard one-way
functions to obtain our second puzzle instantiation; we present an instantiation of this methodology
for the discrete-logarithm problem. As an intermediate result, which may be of independent interest,
we show how to convert any arbitrary oneway function to a “dense” oneway function over {0, 1}`( )
for some `(·) and security parameter   2 Z+ (cf. Theorem 4).
Our puzzle definitions are close in spirit to previous formalizations [RSW96,WJHF04, CMSW09,
MMV11, BGJ+16] with the following distinctions. [CMSW09], defines the hardness of a puzzle
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as a monotonically increasing function that maps the running time of an adversary to the success
rate of solving the puzzle. Contrary to this, our definition, motivated by our proof of knowledge
application, imposes a sharp time threshold, below which the success rate of solving a puzzle becomes
negligible. Also, contrary to time-lock puzzles [RSW96, WJHF04, MMV11, BGJ+16], we do not
restrict the parallelizability of our puzzles as such feature does not hurt (and may even be desirable)
in the PoWorK context. Parallelizable puzzles, like the ones we are focusing on here, have become
very popular by their applications on cryptocurrencies. The requirement there is that the puzzle solver
should spend a minimum of computational resources to find a solution to the puzzle (and may or may
not choose to parallelize).
1.1.4 Applications.
Generally speaking, PoWorKs can be used in applications where we would like to allow access to
either “registered” or “approved” users (who know a witness) or to every user who is willing to invest
computational effort. The key property of PoWorKs is that they enhance privacy since they do not
leak the type of user (i.e. approved or not) to the entity that verifies access. A nice illustration of
this type of application of PoWorKs is in regard to reducing spam email. Dwork and Naor proposed
using proofs of work to control spam e-mails [DN92]. The gist of the idea is that every non-approved
contact of a receiver would have to perform some work (i.e. invest computational effort) in order to
send her an email. A downside of the method is that the mail server has to maintain an updated list
of “approved-contacts” for every user; this can be a privacy concern for the users (not to mention
the cost of updating the approved contacts database). We show how by using PoWorK’s, one can still
enforce the non-approved senders to perform work while preserving user privacy, since the mail server
(who acts as a PoWorK verifier) will not be able to distinguish between approved and non-approved
contacts because of PoWorK indistinguishability property.
Our second application is related to cryptocurrencies based on blockchains to maintain the ledger
of transactions. These systems can be naturally divided by the mechanism they use to produce the
next block in the blockchain as follows: first there are “puzzle-based” ones, (e.g., Bitcoin [Nak08]
and many others that followed1 it), and then there are “knowledge-based” ones, that include those2
that use “proof-of-stake”, “proof-of-activity” or other type of consensus mechanism that relies e.g.,
on a public-key infrastructure, e.g., [BLMR14, DM16, Maz15]). We demonstrate how given two
cryptocurrencies C1, C2 of each type, one can use PoWorK to fuse them into a single cryptocurrency C
with the following properties: (i) in C, the miners that perform C1-type of mining are indistinguishable
from those that perform C2-type of mining, (ii) C would reach consensus in the sense of persistence
of transactions in the ledger under the conjunction of the conditions that systems C1, C2 would do,
(iii) C would satisfy liveness under the disjunction of the conditions that systems C1, C2 would do.3
PoWorK-based cryptocurrencies that fuse the knowledge-based and the puzzle-based approach have
novel features in the context of cryptocurrencies: for instance, by composing a regular Bitcoin-like
cryptocurrency C1 with a centralized cryptocurrency C2 supported by a single authority, we get a
cryptocurrency C that resembles Bitcoin but has a trusted authority with a trapdoor that enables it to
regulate and normalize the block production rate. Such systems may offer a more attractive solution
for nation-states or central banks that wish to issue centralized cryptocurrencies, however they do not
want to be constantly involved with block production and they prefer to leave ledger maintenance to
1E.g., Litecoin, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Dashcoin, etc.
2E.g., Peercoin, NXT, Nushares, Faircoin etc.
3For definitions of properties like liveness and persistence of the ledger we refer to e.g., [GKL15, BMC+15].
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the public, while retaining the ability to issue blocks in case of an emergency situation (e.g., many
miners go offline due to a software problem). The PoWorK indistinguishability property is critically
useful in this setting, since it enables the regulation of the block production rate made by the trusted
party to be indistinguishable to everyone, thus ensuring that the trusted party’s involvement will be
unnoticed and hence will have no impact to the economy that the cryptocurrency supports.
Our third application relates to zero-knowledge protocols and concerns quasi-polynomial time
straight-line simulatable arguments of knowledge. This class of protocols was introduced by [Pas03]
and was motivated by the construction of concurrent zero-knowledge proofs in the plain model (as op-
posed to using a “setup” assumption). In [Pas03] a four-move argument of knowledge was presented
that is quasi-polynomial time simulatable. We show that any suitable PoWorK protocol (cf. Theo-
rem 1 for the precise formulation) implies quasi-polynomial time straight-line simulatable arguments
of knowledge. Given our 3-move PoWorK construction, this immediately yields a 3-round protocol
in this setting which is optimal in terms of efficiency (round complexity is optimal and computational
overhead is just two exponentiations for prover and verifier in total when using the elliptic curves
from [BHKL13]); we note that a similar result in terms of rounds can be obtained via a different
route, specifically, via the efficient OR composition with an input-delayed ⌃-protocol as recently ob-
served in [CPS+16], however the resulting complexity overhead would be at least 5 exponentiations
for prover and verifier in total when instantiated using discrete logarithms.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide basic nota-
tion, and formalize cryptographic puzzles, the additional properties of dense samplable puzzles and
the property of amortization resistance, as well as the notion of PoWorKs by defining completeness,
f -soundness and indistinguishability. In Section 3, we present our efficient dense puzzle based con-
struction built upon an arbitrary 3-move special sound HVZK protocol for a language L and some
puzzle system, and prove that our construction achieves f -soundness and indistinguishability. In the
same section, we present two dense puzzle instantiations. Finally, in Section 4, we describe the appli-
cations of PoWorKs. Namely, (i) a method to reduce the amount of spam email while preserving the
privacy of the receiver, (ii) the composition of knowledge-based and puzzle-based cryptocurrencies
that gives rise to PoWorK-based cryptocurrencies, (iii) an efficient 3-move straight-line concurrent
statistically  poly(log  )-simulatable argument of knowledge as defined in [Pas03, Pas04].
Alternative PoWorK constructions. In Appendix A, we provide a second PoWorK construction
based on the Lapidot-Shamir 3-move special sound computationally special HVZK protocol [LS90],
which is less efficient than the dense puzzle based construction but works for all puzzle systems; note
that this construction is not black-box with respect to the puzzle and depending on the puzzle may
not be public-coin. A third way to construct PoWorK’s can be derived from the recent efficient OR
composition technique that was introduced in [CPS+16] that can be used with “input-delayed” ⌃-
protocols, where the statement need not be determined ahead of time. It is easy to see that in the case
a puzzle accepts an “input-delayed” ⌃ proof of knowledge of the puzzle solution (e.g., a puzzle based
on discrete-logarithms), a third possible construction method for PoWorK’s is facilitated. We stress
however that these alternative methods for constructing PoWorK’s do not combine well with puzzles
based on hash functions and thus may be of only theoretical interest in the context of our primitive.
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2 Definitions
We start by setting the notation to be used in the rest of the paper. By   we denote the security
parameter and by negl(·) the property that a function is negligible in some parameter. Let z $ Z
denote the uniformly at random selection of z from space Z and  [X,Y] the statistical distance of
random variables (or distributions)X,Y. Composition of functions is defined by  .
Let hP(y) $ Vi(x, z) denote the interaction between a prover P and a verifier V on common
input x, auxiliary input z, and P’s private input y. For an algorithm B that is part of an interactive
protocol let viewB and outputB denote the views and the output of B respectively. Let StepsB(x)
be the number of steps (i.e. machine/operation cycles) executed by algorithm B on input x, and
StepsP(hP(y) $ Vi(x, z)) be the number of steps of P , when interacting on inputs x, y, z4. If RL
is a witness relation for the language L 2 NP (i.e. RL polynomial-time-decidable and (x,w) 2 RL
implies that |w|  poly(|x|)), we define the set of witnesses for the membership x 2 L as RL(x) =
{w : (x,w) 2 RL}.
2.1 Cryptographic Puzzles
Roughly speaking, a cryptographic puzzle should be easy to generate, hard to solve, and easy to
verify. Given a specific security parameter  , we denote the puzzle space as PS , the solution space
as SS , and the hardness space as HS . We first define puzzles with a minimum set of properties,
and then add extra properties that are useful in our constructions.
Definition 1 A puzzle system PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify) consists of the following four algo-
rithms:
• Sample(1 , h) is a probabilistic puzzle instance sampling algorithm. On input the security
parameter 1  and a hardness factor h 2 HS , it outputs a puzzle instance puz 2 PS .
• Solve(1 , h, puz) is a probabilistic puzzle solving algorithm. On input the security parameter
1 , a hardness factor h 2 HS  and a puzzle instance puz 2 PS , it outputs a potential
solution soln 2 SS .
• Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) is a deterministic puzzle verification algorithm. On input the security
parameter 1 , a hardness factor h 2 HS , a puzzle instance puz 2 PS  and a potential
solution soln 2 SS  it outputs true or false.
Subsequently, we define the following properties for a puzzle system.
Completeness: We say that a puzzle system PuzSys is complete, if for every h 2 HS :
Pr

puz Sample(1 , h); soln Solve(1 , h, puz) :
Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = false
 
= negl( ).
Note that the number of steps that Solve takes to run is monotonically decreasing in the hardness
factor h and may exponentially depend on  , while Verify should run in polynomial time in  .
4In this work we focus on parallelizable puzzles so counting in number steps as opposed to actual running time is more
intuitive.
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g-Hardness: We say that a puzzle system PuzSys is g-hard for some function g, if for every adver-
sary A, for every auxiliary tape z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and for every h 2 HS :
Pr
24 puz Sample(1 , h); soln A(z, 1 , h, puz) :Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = true^
^StepsA(z, 1 , h, puz)  g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))
35 = negl( ).
Dense Samplable Puzzles. In addition to the standard puzzle definition, for our PoWorK construction
in Section 3 we need puzzles that can be sampled by just generating random strings (i.e. the puzzle
instances should be “dense” over {0, 1}`( ,h) for some function ` and  , h 2 Z+). Formally it holds
that for some function ` in   and h,
 [Sample(1 , h),U`( ,h)] = negl( ),
where U`( ,h) stands for the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`( ,h). For such puzzles we will re-
quire some additional properties. First there should be a puzzle sampler that outputs a valid solution
together with puz:
• SampleSol(1 , h) is a probabilistic solved puzzle instance sampling algorithm. On input the
security parameter 1  and a hardness factor h 2 HS , it outputs a puzzle instance and solution
pair (puz, soln) 2 PS  ⇥ SS .
Correctness of Sampling: We say that a puzzle system PuzSys is correct with respect to sampling,
if for every h 2 HS , we have that:
Pr
⇥
(puz, soln) SampleSol(1 , h) : Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = false ⇤ = negl( ).
Efficiency of Sampling: We say SampleSol is efficient with respect to the puzzle g-hardness, if for
every   2 Z+, h 2 HS  and puz 2 PS , we have that:
StepsSampleSol(1
 , h)) < g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puz)).
Statistical Indistinguishability: We define the following two probability distributions
Ds, ,h
def
=
n
(puz, soln) SampleSol(1 , h)
o
and
Dp, ,h
def
=
n
puz Sample(1 , h), soln Solve(1 , h, puz) : (puz, soln)
o
.
We say a PuzSys is statistically indistinguishable, if for every   2 Z+ and h 2 HS :
 [Ds, ,h,Dp, ,h] = negl( ).
(⌧, k)-Amortization Resistance. For certain applications it is important that the puzzle is not amenable
to amortization. We say that a g-hard puzzle system, PuzSys, is (⌧, k)-amortization resistant if for
every adversary A, for every auxiliary tape z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and for every h 2 HS :
Pr
26664
81  i  k : puzi  Sample(1 , h);
{soln1, . . . , solnk} A(z, 1 , h, {puz1, . . . , puzk}) : 81  i  k : Verify(1 , h, puzi, solni) = true  ^
^
⇣
StepsA(z, 1 , h, {puz1}ki=1)  ⌧
 Pk
i=1 g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 ⌘
37775 = negl( ).
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Informally, (⌧, k)-amortization resistance implies a lower bound on the hardness preservation against
adversaries that attempt to benefit from solving vectors of puzzles of length k.
2.2 Definition of PoWorK
In a PoWorK, the prover P may interact with the verifier V by running in either of the two following
modes: (a) the Proof of Knowledge (PoK) mode, where P convinces V that she knows a witness for
some statement x, or (b) the Proof of WorK (PoW) mode, where P makes calls to the puzzle solving
algorithm to solve a certain puzzle. For some language in NP and a fixed puzzle system PuzSys,
we define PoWorK to satisfy: (i) completeness, (ii) f -soundness (for some “computation-scaling”
function f ) and (iii) indistinguishability, as follows:
Definition 2 (PoWorK) Let L be a language in NP and RL be a witness relation for L. Let
PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify) be a puzzle system and f be a function. We say that (P,V) is
an f -sound Proof of Work or Knowledge (PoWorK) for L and PuzSys, if the following properties are
satisfied:
(i). Completeness: for every x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ) , w 2 RL(x), z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and every hardness
factor h 2 HS , it holds that
(i.a) Pr[outV  hP(w)$ Vi(x, z, h) : outV = accept] > 1  1/poly( )
and
(i.b) Pr[outV  hPSolve(1 ,h,·) $ Vi(x, z, h) : outV = accept] > 1  1/poly( ) .
(ii). f -Soundness: For every x 2 {0, 1}poly( ), y, z 2 {0, 1}⇤, every hardness factor h 2 HS  and
prover P⇤ define by ⇡x,y,z,h,  the probability
Pr

puz Sample(1 , h); outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : (outV = accept
 
^StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h))  f(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))
 
.
f -Soundness holds if there are non-negligible functions s, q such that for any P⇤, there exists
a PPT witness-extraction algorithm K such that for any   2 N, x 2 {0, 1}poly( ), y, z 2
{0, 1}⇤, h 2 HS , if ⇡x,y,z,h,    s( ) (representing the knowledge error), then
Pr[KP⇤(x, y, z, h) 2 RL(x)]   q( ) .
(iii). Statistical (resp. Computational) Indistinguishability: for every x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ), w 2
RL(x), z 2 {0, 1}⇤, for every hardness factor h 2 HS  and for every verifier (resp. PPT
verifier) V⇤ , the following two random variables are statistically (resp. computationally) in-
distinguishable:
DV
⇤
PoK
def
= {viewV⇤  hP(w)$ V⇤i(x, z, h)}
DV
⇤
PoW
def
=
n
viewV⇤  hPSolve(1 ,h,·) $ V⇤i(x, z, h)
o
.
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Intuitively, soundness is related to the hardness of solving a presumably hard cryptographic puzzle.
The hardness threshold T is set to be the (probabilistic) computational complexity (in number of
steps) of the puzzle solver, when the latter is provided some output of the puzzle sampling algorithm,
scaled to some function f . According to Definition 2, any prover who does not know a witness, cannot
convince the verifier in less than f(T ) steps with some good probability. Observe that in the definition
of f -soundness, the convincing capability of the prover is limited by the hardness of solving puzzle
challenges. This implies that in an f -sound protocol, provers who do not know (per the knowledge
extractor) are forced to “work” in order to convince the verifier. The indistinguishability property of
PoWorKs implies that a (potentially malicious) verifier cannot distinguish the running mode (PoK or
PoW) that P follows.
3 The Dense Puzzle Based PoWorK Construction
In this section, we show how to transform an arbitrary 3-move, public coin, special sound, honest ver-
ifier zero-knowledge (SS-HVZK) into a 3-move public-coin PoWorK. Our construction is lightweight
and requires dense samplable puzzle systems that we formalized in Section 1. Additionally, we pro-
vide a second construction (cf. App. A) which is less efficient, non-black-box on the puzzle, but it
works for all puzzle systems and may not be public-coin (depending on the puzzle). For both con-
structions, we consider a puzzle system PuzSys that achieves completeness and g-hardness for some
function g : N  ! R+. In addition, for dense samplable puzzle systems, we require correctness,
efficient samplability, and statistical indistinguishability.
3.1 Preliminaries
The puzzle, solution and hardness spaces are denoted by PS ,SS ,HS , as in Section 2.1. Our
PoWorK protocols are interactive proofs between a prover P and a verifier V , denoted by (P,V).
The challenge space of our dense puzzle based construction (P,V), denoted by CS , is deter-
mined by the security parameter  . From an algebraic point of view, CS  is set to be a group with
operation  , where performing   and inverting an element should be efficient. For the first construc-
tion, we require that PS  ✓ CS . For instance, we may set CS  as the group
 
GF(2`( ),  , where
`( ) is the length of the challenges and   is the bitwise XOR operation. Of course, one may select a
different setting which could be tailor made to the algebraic properties of the underlying primitives.
Let ChSampler be the algorithm that samples a challenge from CS . For a fixed security param-
eter, we define the following random variables (r.v.):
• The challenge sampling r.v. C ,h
def
= ChSampler(1 , h).
• The puzzle sampling r.v. P ,h
def
= {puz Sample(1 , h) : puz}.
Finally, we denote by x  D (resp. DInv) the r.v. of performing   on some fixed x 2 CS  and an
element y sampled from r.v. D (resp. inverting an element sampled from D). The r.v. D   x is
defined similarly. Formally,
x D def= {y  D : x  y}, D  x def= {y  D : y   x}, DInv def= {y  D :  y}.
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3-move Special-sound HVZK (SS-HVZK) protocols. SS-HVZK protocols are a class of interac-
tive proofs between a prover and a verifier, who have a common input x where the prover generates a
zero-knowledge proof that he knows a witness w such that (x,w) 2 RL, where RL is a witness rela-
tion for language L 2 NP . In a 3-move public coin SS-HVZK protocol ⇧ = (P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧), (i)
the prover first runs (a, ) P1⇧(w, x) and sends the first message a to the verifier; (ii) the verifier
picks a challenge c uniformly at random from some challenge space CS⇧ and sends the challenge c
to the prover; (iii) the prover then runs r  P2⇧( , c) and sends the second message r to the verifier.
The verifier accepts the proof iff Ver⇧(x, a, c, r) = 1.
We say that the protocol satisfies the computational (resp. statistical) honest-verifier zero knowl-
edge (HVZK) property, if there exists a polynomial-time simulator Sim⇧, which on input x 2 L
outputs an accepting transcript of the form (a, c, r) which distribution is computationally (resp. sta-
tistically) indistinguishable from an actual transcript generated by the interaction of the prover and
the honest verifier. A stronger property named special HVZK (sHVZK) requires that there exists a
simulator that produces indistinguishable transcripts on input x 2 L and a (possibly maliciously sam-
pled) challenge c. When we allow the simulator to obtain an auxiliary input, we say that the protocol
satisfies the auxiliary input (s)HVZK property. It is straightforward that statistical (s)HVZK is also
statistical auxiliary input (s)HVZK.
Finally, we say that a 3-move public coin HVZK protocol is special-sound if there exists a
polynomial-time knowledge extractorK⇧ that on input x and any pair of accepting transcripts, (a, c, r),
(a, c0, r0) for x where c 6= c0, can output a witness w such that (x,w) 2 RL.
3.2 The Dense Puzzle Based Compiler
We now provide a detailed description of our protocol (P,V), which can be viewed as a compiler
that can transform a SS-HVZK protocol ⇧ = (P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧) for L 2 NP and a g-hard puzzle
system PuzSys into a 3-move PoWorK. The resulting PoWorK protocol achieves ⇥(g)-hardness and
statistical indistiguishability. From a syntax point of view, our compiler will set the challenge space
of the PoWorK CS  to be equal to CS⇧. We denote by Sim⇧ the HVZK simulator of ⇧.
The protocol (P,V) can be executed in either of the two following modes:
1. Proof of Knowledge (PoK) mode: P has a witness w 2 RL(x) as private input. In order
to prove knowledge of w to V , P runs P1⇧ and P2⇧ as described by the original SS-HVZK
protocol, with the difference that instead of providing P2⇧ with the challenge c from V directly,
P runs the puzzle sampler algorithm to receive a pair of a puzzle and its solution, (puz, soln),
computes the value c˜ = c  puz and runs P2⇧ with challenge c˜.
2. Proof of Work (PoW) mode: P has no private input and tries to convince V that it has per-
formed a minimum amount of computational “work” (i.e. at least some expected number of
steps). To achieve this, P runs Sim⇧ to simulate a transcript of the original SS-HVZK protocol.
Then, it receives the challenge c from V and computes the value puz = ( c)   c˜. It runs the
Solve algorithm on input puz, and if puz is a puzzle in PS  (which, as we argue later, must
occur with high probability), then it obtains a solution soln of puz, except for some negligible
error.
The verification mechanism, must be the same for both modes, so that indistinguishability can be
achieved. Namely, the verifier checks that: (i) the relation c˜ = c   puz holds, (ii) the transcript of
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Statement: x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ).
Prover’s private input: w 2 RL(x).
P: (a˜, 1) P1⇧(w, x).
P ! V: a˜.
P  V: c ChSampler(1 , h);
P : • sample a puzzle-solution pair
(puz, soln) SampleSol(1 , h);
• set c˜ = c  puz;
• execute r˜  P2⇧( 1, c˜);
P ! V: c˜, r˜, puz, soln.
Verification:
1. c˜ = c  puz.
2. Ver⇧(x, a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1.
3. Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = true.
(a) Knowing the witness (PoK)
Statement: x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ).
Prover’s private input:  
P : • execute (a˜, c˜, r˜) Sim⇧(x);
P ! V: a˜.
P  V: c ChSampler(1 , h);
P : • set puz = ( c)  c˜;
• compute a puzzle solution
soln Solve(1 , h, puz);
P ! V: c˜, r˜, puz, soln.
Verification:
1. c˜ = c  puz.
2. Ver⇧(x, a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1.
3. Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = true.
(b) Doing work (PoW)
Figure 1: The Dense Puzzle Based PoWorK Construction for fixed security parameter   and pre-
determined hardness factor h 2 HS , given a 3-move-SS-HVZK protocol ⇧ for language L and
a dense samplable puzzle system PuzSys satisfying that PS  ✓ CS  = CS⇧; ChSampler is the
challenge sampling algorithm over CS .
the SS-HVZK protocol is accepting and (iii) the prover has output a correct pair of a puzzle puz and
some solution soln of puz. The protocol (P,V) is presented in detail in Figure 1.
3.3 Security of the Dense Puzzle Based Construction.
In order to prove that our protocol satisfies soundness and indistinguishability, we need to assume
that the challenge and puzzle distributions satisfy some plausible properties and that the presumed
g-hardness of the puzzle system dominates the step complexity of the group operation and challenge
sampling algorithms. In detail, we require that:
(A). The challenge and puzzle sampling distributions are statistically close.
(B). The challenge sampling distribution is (statistically) invariant to any group operation, i.e. (a)
inverting a challenge sampled from CS  and (b) performing   operations on some element x
in CS  = CS⇧ and a sampled challenge. Observe that these two assumptions imply that the
puzzle sampling distribution is also (statistically)  -invariant.
(C). With high probability, the number of steps needed for StepsSolve(1 , h, puz) to solve a g-hard
puzzle puz according toP ,h, scaled to the puzzle hardness function g, is more than the number
of steps of performing group operations (inversion and   operation), or sampling from CS .
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(A). For every hardness factor h 2 HS , the r.v. C ,h and P ,h are ✏1-statistically close, where ✏1(·) is a
negligible function.
(B). For every x 2 CS  and hardness factor h 2 HS , the r.v. C ,h is ✏2-statistically close to the r.v.
x C ,h, C ,h   x and CInv ,h, where ✏2(·) is a negligible function.
(C). There exists a constant  < 1 and a negligible function ✏3(·) s.t. for every hardness factor h 2 HS 
and every r, r0 2 CS 
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h) :  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) >
> StepsChSampler(1
 , h) + StepsInv(r) + Steps (r, r0)]   1  ✏3( ),
where StepsInv, Steps  denote the number of steps needed for inversion and group operation in CS .
Figure 2: Assumptions for our Dense Puzzle Based PoWorK Construction, where C ,h and P ,h are
the challenge sampling and the puzzle sampling distributions respectively.
The assumptions described are stated formally in Figure 2. Assumptions (A) and (B) can be
met for meaningful distributions, widely used in cryptographic protocols. For example, when C ,h
and P ,h are close to uniform, it is straightforward that assumption (A) holds. Moreover, since the
uniform distribution is invariant under group operations, we have that assumption (B) also holds. The
assumption (C) is expected to hold for any meaningful cryptographic puzzle construction. Indeed,
if solving a puzzle is believed to be hard (on average) within a bounded amount of steps T , then
performing efficient tasks, such as group operations or sampling a challenge in the space where this
puzzle belongs must be feasible in a number of steps much less than T .
We prove that our dense puzzle based construction is a PoWorK, assuming (A),(B) and (C), the
g-hardness of PuzSys and the soundness and ZK properties of the original SS-HVZK protocol. The
soundness of our protocol is in constant relation with the hardness of PuzSys.
Theorem 1 Let L be a language in NP and let ⇧ = (P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧) be a special-sound 3-move
statistical HVZK protocol for L, where the challenge sampling distribution is uniform. Let PuzSys =
(Sample, SampleSol, Solve,Verify) be a dense samplable puzzle system that satisfies g-hardness for
some function g. Define (P,V) as the protocol described in Figure 1 when built upon ⇧,PuzSys and
assume that (A),(B),(C) in Figure 2 hold. Then, (P,V) is a  (1  )/2  · g-sound PoWorK for L and
PuzSys with statistical indistiguishability, where  is the constant defined in assumption (C).
Proof:
Completeness. By the completeness of ⇧ and the correctness of PuzSys, the dense puzzle based
PoWorK construction is complete in the case that P executes the PoK mode of the protocol. Regard-
ing the PoW mode, an honest execution of PuzSys is incorrect, only if either of the two following
cases is true:
(i). puz = ( c)   c˜ 2 CS  \ PS , i.e. puz is not a puzzle. By assumptions (A), (B) in Figure 2,
this happens with negligible probability, since
 [ P ,h,C ,h]  ✏1( ) ^ [C ,h,CInv ,h   c˜]  2 · ✏2( ))
)  [P ,h,CInv ,h   c˜]  ✏1( ) + 2 · ✏2( ),
where we applied (B) two times (one for inversion and one for   operation).
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(ii). puz is a puzzle, but the puzzle solver algorithm Solve does not output a solution for puz.
Namely, we have thatVerify(1 , h, puz, soln) = false. By the completeness property ofPuzSys,
this also happens with negligible probability.
Therefore, (P,V) achieves completeness with high probability, as required in Definition 2. 
(1   )/2  · g-Soundness. First, we make use of the special soundness PPT extractor K⇧ of ⇧ to
construct a knowledge extractor K that on input (x, y, z, h) and given the code of an arbitrary prover
Pˆ , executes the following steps:
1. By applying standard rewinding, K interacts with Pˆ(y) for statement x and auxiliary in-
put z, using two challenges c1, c2 sampled from C ,h and receives two protocol transcripts
ha˜1, c1, (c˜1, r˜1, puz1, soln1)i and ha˜1, c2, (c˜2, r˜2, puz2, soln2)i.
2. K runs K⇧ on input (x, ha˜1, c˜1, r˜1i, ha˜1, c˜2, r˜2i).
3. K returns the output of K⇧.
Since K⇧ is a PPT algorithm, K also runs in polynomial time.
Assume that for some x 2 {0, 1}poly( ), y 2 {0, 1}⇤, z 2 {0, 1}⇤, h 2 HS , there exists a prover
P⇤ and a non-negligible function s(·) s.t
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h); outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : (outV = accept)^
^ StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h)) 
 
(1  )/2  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))]   s( ).
We construct an algorithmW that makes use of P⇤ to break the g-hardness of PuzSys. The input
thatW receives is h(x, y, z), 1 , h, puzi, where (x, y, z) is the auxiliary input and puz sampled from
Sample(1 , h). Then,W executes the following steps:
1. It samples c1 by running ChSampler(1 , h).
2. It interacts with P⇤(y) for statement x, auxiliary input z, hardness factor h and challenge c1. It
receives the transcript ha˜1, c1, (c˜1, r˜1, puz1, soln1)i.
3. It computes the inverse of puz, denoted by ( puz).
4. It computes c2 = c˜1   ( puz).
5. It rewinds P⇤ at the challenge phase and provides P⇤ with challenge c2. It receives a second
transcript ha˜1, c2, (c˜2, r˜2, puz2, soln2)i.
6. It returns the value soln2.
By the assumption for P⇤ and the splitting Lemma, we have that when P⇤ is challenged with two
honestly selected c1, c2, it outputs two accepting transcripts by running in no more than
 
(1 )/2  ·
g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puz)) steps with at least (s( )/2)2 probability. By Equal we denote the event that
this happens and c˜1 = c˜2 holds. Obviously, either Equal, or ¬Equal will occur with probability at
least (s( )/2)2/2 = s( )2/8.
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Assume that Equal happens with at least s( )2/8 probability. We will show that this case
leads to a contradiction; namely, W will output a solution of puz while running in no more than
g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puz)) steps, hence breaking the g-hardness of PuzSys.
We observe that for any puz, if both transcripts generated by the interaction with P⇤ are accepting
and the values c˜1, c˜2 are equal, then we have that 
c2 = c˜1   ( puz)
  ^ (c˜2 = c2   puz2) ^ (c˜1 = c˜2)) puz2 =    ( puz)  = puz,
where the second equality holds due to verification step 1. Therefore, it holds that
Verify(1 , h, puz2, soln2) = true, Verify(1 , h, puz, soln2) = true. (1)
By the assumptions (A),(B) in Figure 2, we have that there are negligible functions ✏1( ), ✏2( )
s.t. for any c˜1 that P⇤ returns,
 [c˜1  CInv ,h, c˜1  PInv ,h] < 2✏1( ) and  [C ,h, c˜1  CInv ,h] < 2✏2( ),
where in the first and second inequality, we applied assumptions (A) and (B) respectively two times
(one for inversion and one for   operation). Therefore, by the triangular inequality we have that
 [C ,h, c˜1  PInv ,h] < 2✏1( ) + 2✏2( ). (2)
Eq. (2) implies that the probability distribution of c2 = c˜1   ( puz) that W computes is [2✏1(·) +
2✏2(·)]-statistically close to the challenge sampling distribution of V .
By construction, the running time ofW (in number of steps) is at most
2·StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h))+Steps
 
(( puz)))+Steps(c˜1 ( puz))+StepsChSampler(1 , h) .
By assumption (C) in Figure 2, there is a negligible function ✏3(·) and a constant  < 1 s.t.
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h) :  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) < StepsChSampler(1 , h)+
+Steps(( puz)) + Steps(c˜1   ( puz))]  ✏3( ). (3)
When Equal occurs, then it holds that
StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h)) 
 
(1  )/2  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)),
hence by the assumption forP⇤ and Eq. (2), (3), the probability that the running time ofW is bounded
by
StepsW(1 , (x, y, z), h, puz) 
 2 · StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h)) +  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) 
 (2 ·  (1  )/2 ) · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) +  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) =
= g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puz)),
is at leastPr[Equal]  2✏1( )+2✏2( )+✏3( ) . By Eq. (1) ,(2), (3), and the assumptionPr[Equal]  
s( )2/8, we have that for auxiliary tape (x, y, z) and hardness factor h:
Pr
266664
puz Sample(1 , h);
soln⇤  W(1 , (x, y, z), h, puz) :
Verify(1 , h, puz, soln⇤) = true ^
^StepsW(1 , (x, y, z), h, puz)
 g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))
377775   s( )2/8   2✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏3( ) ,
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which contradicts to the g-hardness of PuzSys, as s( )2/8    2✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏3( )  is a non-
negligible function. Therefore, it holds that Pr[Equal]  s( )2/8 which implies
Pr[¬Equal]   s( )2/8. (4)
By the construction of K and the special soundness property of ⇧, we have that K will return a
witness for x whenever K⇧ is provided with different c˜1, c˜2. Define q( ) = s( )2/8. By Eq. (4),
when K is given oracle access to P⇤ it holds that
Pr[KP⇤(x, y, z, h) 2 RL(x)] = Pr[¬Equal]   q( ).
Thus, we conclude that our protocol is
 
(1  )/2  · g-sound.
Statistical Indistinguishability. Assume that the protocol described in Figure 1 does not satisfy the
PoWorK indistinguishability property in Definition 2. Then, for some (x, z, h) there exists a verifier
V⇤ that w.l.o.g. outputs a single bit and can distinguish between:
DV
⇤
PoK = {viewV⇤  hP(w)$ V⇤i(x, z, h)} and
DV
⇤
PoW =
n
viewV⇤  hPSolve(1 ,h,·) $ V⇤i(x, z, h)
o
.
with non-negligible advantage ⌘( ).
In the following, we will show that if such a V⇤ exists, then we can construct an adversary B
who breaks the statistical (auxiliary input) HVZK property of the underlying 3-move protocol ⇧ =
(P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧). This means that B can distinguish between:
D⇧ =
n
(a˜, 1) P1⇧(w, x); c˜ $ CS⇧; r˜  P2⇧( 1, c˜) : (a˜, c˜, r˜)
o
and
DSim = {(a˜, c˜, r˜) Sim⇧(x, (z, h)) : (a˜, c˜, r˜)}
with some non-negligible advantage ⌘0( ), where (z, h) is the auxiliary input. Namely, B takes as
input (x, (z, h), (a˜, c˜, r˜)), and works as follows:
1. Invokes V⇤ with input x, z, h and first move message a˜.
2. V⇤ responds back with his challenge c.
3. B computes puz = ( c)  c˜ and runs Solve on input (1 , h, puz) to receive back soln.
4. B sends (c˜, r˜, puz, soln) to V⇤.
5. B returns V⇤’s output b⇤.
By construction of B, what is left to argue is that puz = ( c)   c˜ and soln  Solve(1 , h, puz)
are indistinguishable from a pair (puz0, soln0) that was picked by SampleSol(1 , h). We study the
following two cases:
1. B’s input is sampled according toD⇧: By the assumption (B) in Figure 2 and for any c returned
by V⇤, we have that:
 [C ,h,C
Inv
 ,h   c˜] < 2✏2( ),
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where we applied (B) two times (one for inversion and one for   operation). By assumption
(A), we have that
 [C ,h,P ,h] < ✏1( ).
By the triangular inequality, we have that for the distribution of puz = ( c)  c˜, it holds that
 [P ,h,C
Inv
 ,h   c˜] < ✏1( ) + 2✏2( ).
By the statistical indistinguishability property of PuzSys (Definition 1), we have that the dis-
tribution {soln  Solve(1 , h, puz) : soln} is ✏4( )-statistically close to the distribution
{(soln0, puz0)  SampleSol(1 , h) : soln0}, for some negligible function ✏4. Consequently,
the probability distribution of puz that B computes is [✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏4( )]-statistically
close to the puzzle sampling distribution.
2. B’s input is sampled according toDSim: in this case, it is straightforward that B simulates per-
fectly the PoW mode of the PoWorK protocol.
By the above and given that the probability of success of V⇤ is at least ⌘( ), we have that  Pr[(a˜, c˜, r˜) D⇧ : B(x, (z, h), a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1] 
  Pr[(a˜, c˜, r˜) DSim : B(x, (z, h), a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1]
    
 
    Pr[viewV⇤  DV⇤PoK : V⇤(viewV⇤) = 1]  (✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏4( ))   
  Pr[viewV⇤  DV⇤PoW : V⇤(viewV⇤) = 1]
     
 
   Pr[viewV⇤  DV⇤PoK : V⇤(viewV⇤) = 1] 
  Pr[viewV⇤  DV⇤PoW : V⇤(viewV⇤) = 1]
     (✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏4( ))   
  ⌘( )   ✏1( ) + 2✏2( ) + ✏4( ) .
Therefore, B is successful in breaking the statistical HVZK property of the underlying 3-move SS-
HVZK protocol with non-negligible advantage ⌘0( ) = ⌘( )   ✏1( )+ 2✏2( )+ ✏4( ) . This leads
us to the conclusion that the protocol in Figure 1 is a PoWorK with statistical indistinguishability.
2
Remark. Theorem 1 can be extended to encompass the case where the protocol ⇧ to be compiled in
the construction described in Figure 1 achieves T ( )-computational HVZK, i.e. it is HVZK for every
verifier B which runs in T ( ) steps. Specifically, in the indistinguishability proof the running time of
the HVZK adversary B is (in number of steps) bounded by:
StepsV⇤(h(P1⇧,P2⇧)(w), Ver⇧(c˜)i(x, z, h))+
+StepsInv(c) + Steps (( c), c˜) + StepsSolve(1 , h, puz).
Therefore, we can prove that if T ( ) is an asymptotically larger function than the time of the puzzle
solving algorithm, then our dense puzzle based construction achieves computational indistinguisha-
bility.
16
3.4 Dense Puzzle Instantiation in the Random Oracle Model
We now instantiate a dense puzzle system in the random oracle model. For a given security parameter
 , let O : {0, 1}⇤ 7! {0, 1}m be a random oracle, where m    /2. Our dense puzzle system is
described in Figure 3.
Define PS  = {0, 1} , SS  = {0, 1} , andHS  = [log2  , /4]. LetH(·) := LSB /2(O(·)), where LSBk
stands for k least significant bits.
• Sample(1 , h): Return puz $ {0, 1} .
• SampleSol(1 , h): Pick random x $ {0, 1}  and y $ {0, 1} /2. Return puz = (H(x, y), y) and
soln = x.
• Solve(1 , h, puz):
– Parse puz to (z, y); set soln = ? and initialize an empty set X .
– For ctr =
 
1, . . . , 2h+2 log  
 
:
Randomly pick x $ {0, 1}  \ X , and add x to X . Set soln = x if LSBh(z) =
LSBh(H(x, y)).
– Return soln.
• Verify(1 , h, puz, soln): Parse puz to (z, y). Return true if and only if LSBh(z) = LSBh(H(soln, y)).
Figure 3: The Dense Puzzle System from the Random Oracle O.
Theorem 2 Let   2 Z+ be the security parameter. Define PS  = {0, 1} , SS  = {0, 1} ,
and HS  = [log2  , /4]. Let O be a random oracle mapping from {0, 1}⇤ to {0, 1}m, where
m    /2. For any h 2 HS , the puzzle system PuzSys described in Figure 3 is correct, complete
with Solve’s running time 2h+2 log  , efficiently samplable, statistically indistinguishable, and g-hard,
where g(T ) = T 1/c, for any constant c > 2. In addition, for any k that is O(2 /8), PuzSys is
(id(·), k)-amortization resistant, where id(·) is the identity function.
Proof:
Correctness and efficient samplability. The correctness and efficient samplability is straightfor-
ward.
Completeness. We now show the completeness, namely the probability thatPr[puz $ {0, 1}  ;?  
Solve(1 , h, puz)] is negligible in  . We can view eachH(·, y) oracle query as an independent random
variable Aj 2 {0, 1}, with E[Aj ] = p = 2 h, where Aj = 1 if and only if LSBh(H(x⇤j , y)) =
LSBh(z). Let µ denote the expected value ofA =
P2h+2 log  
j=1 Aj , so we have µ = E[
P2h+2 log  
j=1 Aj ] =P2h+2 log  
j=1 E[Aj ] = p · 2h+2 log   = 22 log   =  2. Hence, let   = 1  1 2 , by the generalized Chernoff
bound, the probability Solve outputs ? for a given puz is
Pr[A < 1] = Pr[A < (1   )µ]  e  
2µ
2 = e 
(1 1/ 2)2
2 · 2 = negl( ) .
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Statistically indistinguishability. To show  [Ds, ,h, Dp, ,h] = negl( ), we first need to show that
for all   and h 2 HS , the distribution P ( , h) =
 
puz|(puz, soln) SampleSol(1 , h) of sam-
pled puzzle is statistically close to a uniform distribution over the PS  = {0, 1} . Recall that puz
consists of H(x, y) and y, where x,y are chosen independently and uniformly at random. Analo-
gous to the leftover hash lemma (LHL) [HILL93], we can show that  [P ( , h),U ]  2  /4+1 as
follows. We define the collision probability as CP (H(x, y), y) = Pr[(H(x, y), y), (H(x0, y0), y0)],
where (x0, y0) is independent of and identically distributed to (x, y), i.e. U  ⇥U /2. Since O is a
random oracle, we have
CP (H(x, y), y) = CP (y) · (CP (x) + Pr[H(x, y) = H(x0, y)|x = x0])
 2  /2 · (2   + 2  /2) = (1 + 2  /2) · 2   .
Meanwhile, we have
(k(H(x, y), y) U /2 ⇥U /2k2)2 = CP (H(x, y), y)  CP (U /2 ⇥U /2)
 (1 + 2  /2) · 2     2   = 2 3 /2 .
Therefore,
 [P ( , h),U ] =
1
2
k(H(x, y), y) U /2 ⇥U /2k1
 2 /2 1 · k(H(x, y), y) U /2 ⇥U /2k2
 2 /2 1 ·
p
2 3 /2 = 2  /4+1 .
Secondly, due to that fact that O is a random oracle, the distribution of puz and soln are independent.
Moreover, the Solve is probabilistic algorithm that tests the uniform randomly selected solution can-
didates, and thus it is obvious that Solve(1 , h, puz)) outputs a random soln from the solution set of
puz, which is identically distributed to the solution soln in (puz, soln)  SampleSol(1 , h). There-
fore, we have the distance [Ds, ,h, Dp, ,h] = negl( ) as claimed.
g-hardness. First of all, although the adversary’s auxiliary input is z 2 {0, 1}⇤ can be arbitrarily
long, the adversary is only able to read O(g(2h+2 log  ))  O(2 /4) content of z under its running
time limitation. Since y $ {0, 1} /2, the probability that the read content of z contains a H(⇤, y)
oracle query is at most pw = 2
 /4
2 /2
= negl( ). In the rest case, we assume that each random oracle
query takes 1 unit steps. Due to the property of random oracle, we expect 2  h solutions in the
solution space {0, 1}  for any given puzzle instance puz. The probability the adversary cannot find a
solution within 2(h+2 log  )/c trials is
pl =
  2  2  h
2(h+2 log  )/c
   2 
2(h+2 log  )/c
  > (1  1
2h (h+2 log  )/c
)2
(h+2 log  )/c   1  2 (1  2c )h+ 4c log   .
Since c > 2 and h   log2  , we have the probability the adversary A can find a solution is
pw + (1  pw)(1  pl) = negl( ).
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(id(·), k)-amortization resistance. Let A be an adversary that runs in O(k2(h+2 log  )/c) steps and is
given a set of k sampled puzzles puz1, . . . , puzk = (z1, y1), . . . , (zk, yk). By the construction of the
algorithm SampleSol, we have that the probability that all k values y1, . . . , yk are distinct is
pd = 1 · (1  2  /2) · · · (1  (k   1)2  /2) > (1  k2  /2)k   1  k22  /2  
  1  (2 /8)2 · 2  /2 = 1  2  /4 = 1  negl( ).
Assume that k values y1, . . . , yk are distinct. As in the proof of g-hardness, since A runs in
O(k2(h+2 log  )/c) = O(2( /8+h+2 log  )/c) = O(2 /4), for every i 2 [k], the probability that A reads
an oracle query H(·, yi) from the auxiliary tape is pi  2  /4. By the union bound, the probability
that A reads any oracle query H(·, y1) . . . , H(·, yk) from the auxiliary tape is pw 
Qk
i=1 pi 
k2  /4  2  /8 · 2  /4  2  /8 = negl( ).
Let q1, . . . , qk be the number of oracle queries H(·, y1), . . . , H(·, yk) that A makes. By the
restriction on the running time of A, we have that Pki=1 qi  k2(h+2 log  )/c. By an averaging argu-
ment, there is an i⇤ 2 [k] such that A makes at most 2(h+2 log  )/c oracle queries H(·, yi⇤). Due to
the property of random oracle, we expect 2  h solutions in the solution space {0, 1}  for puzi⇤ . As
previously, the probability that A cannot find a solution of puzi⇤ within 2(h+2 log  )/c trials is more
than 1  2 (1  2c )h+ 4c log  . Since c > 2 and h   log2  , the probability that A can find a solution for
all puz1, . . . , puzk is negl( ).
2
Remark. We emphasize that the dense puzzle systemPuzSys described in Figure 3 is ⌧ -amortization
resistant with the identity function ⌧ for simultaneously solving k puzzles {puzi}ki=1, where k =
poly( ). This is due to the fact that each of the k puzzles have distinct nonce y 2 {0, 1} /2 with high
probability, and thus the random oracle query made for puzi gives no information about the puzzle
puzj , for j 6= i. We omit a detailed discussion here and refer to [GJKY13] (Proposition A.2) for
similar analysis.
3.5 Dense Puzzle Instantiation From Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we show how to construct a puzzle system whose puzzle instance distribution is
statistically close to the uniform distribution (over {0, 1}m( )) without random oracles. The main
challenge is, given an arbitrary oneway function  : X 7! Y , to build another oneway function
with uniform output distribution (on random inputs) while still maintaining its onewayness. As an
intuition, we would like to first map the output of the given oneway function from Y to {0, 1}` using
an efficient injective map (which is usually the bit representation of y 2 Y), and then apply a strong
extractor on it. Let Ext : {0, 1}`⇥ {0, 1}d 7! {0, 1}m be a strong extractor as defined at Definition 3.
Definition 3 Function Ext : {0, 1}`⇥{0, 1}d 7! {0, 1}m is (t, ✏)-strong extractor if for any t-source
X (over {0, 1}`), we have [(S,Ext(X,S)), (S,Um)]  ✏, where S $ {0, 1}d andUm $ {0, 1}m
are drawn uniformly and independently of X .
The new oneway function  U : X ⇥ {0, 1}d 7! {0, 1}m ⇥ {0, 1}d is defined as  U (x, s) =
(Ext( (x), s), s). According to LHL [HILL93], ifH1(x)   m+2 log(1/✏), then the output of  U is
at most ✏-far from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}m+d. However, in order to maintain its oneway-
ness, we need an extra property of the strong extractor – Target Collision Resistance (TCR), i.e. given
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x and s, it is computationally infeasible to find x0 such that x 6= x0 and Ext(x, s) = Ext(x0, s). We
construct TCR strong extractors from regular universal oneway hash functions (UOWHFs), initially
proposed by Naor and Yung [NY89]. We first formally define the TCR property for a strong extractor
in Definition 4.
Definition 4 Let Ext : {0, 1}`( ) ⇥ {0, 1}d( ) 7! {0, 1}m( ) be a strong extractor. We say Ext is
target collision resistant if for all PPT adversary A, the following probability:
Pr
"
x A(1 ); s $ {0, 1}d( ) : x0  A(s) :
x, x0 2 {0, 1}`( ) ^ x 6= x0 ^ Ext(x, s) = Ext(x0, s)
#
= negl( ).
A stronger notion, collision resistant extractors, was introduced by Dodis [Dod05]. Collision resistant
extractors were applied to construct perfectly oneway probabilistic hash functions proposed [CMR98]
in 2005. The construction of such collision resistant extractors relies on a variant of leftover hash
lemma proved by Dodis and Smith [DS05] that we recap, for completeness, in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 ([DS05]) Let f : {0, 1}N 7! {0, 1}m be an arbitrary function. Let H = {Hi|i 2 I} be a
pairwise independent hash function family with key space I, domain {0, 1}n and range {0, 1}N . If
X is a t-source over {0, 1}n with t   m+ 2 log(1/✏) + 1, then we have
 [
 
I, f(HI(X))
 
,
 
I, f(UN )
 
]  ✏
where I $ I andUN $ {0, 1}N are drawn uniformly and independently of X .
Our observation is that in the same way that [Dod05] employ regular collision resistant hash func-
tions (CRHF) to derive collision resistant strong extractors, we can use regular universal oneway hash
function (UOWHF), to obtain TCR strong extractor. The notion of UOWHF was initially proposed by
Naor and Yung [NY89] where they showed that UOWHFs can be constructed by composing oneway
permutations with (weakly) pairwise independent hash functions. Since then, many constructions of
UOWHFs have been proposed, assuming the existence of regular oneway functions [SY90] or any
oneway functions [Rom90, HHR+10].5 We recall the definition of UOWHF as Definition 5.
Definition 5 A family of functions F  =
n
Fi : {0, 1}`1( ) 7! {0, 1}`2( ) |8i 2 {0, 1} 
o
is a family
of universal oneway hash functions if it satisfies:
• Efficiency: Given i 2 {0, 1}  and x 2 {0, 1}`1( ), Fi(x) can be evaluated in time poly(`1( ), ).
• Compressing: `2( ) < `1( ).
• Target Collision Resistance: For all PPT A, the following is negligible in  :
Pr[x A(1 );i $ {0, 1}  ;x0  A(i) : 
x, x0 2 {0, 1}`1( )   ^ (x 6= x0) ^  Fi(x) = Fi(x0) ] . (5)
5We note that, on the contrary, CR strong extractors cannot be built from arbitrary oneway functions, since Simon
[Sim98] gave a black-box separation between CRHFs and oneway functions.
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We would like to useH2n =
 
H(a,b)(x) = ax+ b|8a 6= 0, a, b 2 GF(2n)
 
as the family of pair-
wise independent permutations and a regular UOWHF family F  to construct our TCR strong ex-
tractors. Define Fˆi(·) := (Fi(·), i), where Fi 2 F . Our TCR strong extractor is constructed as
Ext(x, (i, s)) = Fˆi  Hs(x). Note that regularity of the UOWHFs is important to ensure that the out-
put distribution of such strong extractors is close to the uniform distribution, as Fi(U`1( )) ⌘ U`2( ).
On the other hand, some UOWHF constructions give regular UOWHFs by default (i.e., the UOWHFs
constructed by the oneway permutation based approach [NY89]).
Theorem 3 Let `( ),m( ) be polynomials. Let
H2·`( ) =
n
Hs : {0, 1}`( ) 7! {0, 1}`( ) |8s 2 {0, 1}2·`( )
o
be a pairwise independent permutation family. Assume that
F  =
n
Fi : {0, 1}`( ) 7! {0, 1}m( ) |8i 2 {0, 1} 
o
is a regular UOWHF family. Then, Ext (x, (i, s)) = (Fi(Hs(x)), i) is a (t, ✏)-TCR strong extractor
from {0, 1}`( ) ⇥ {0, 1} +2·`( ) to {0, 1} +m( ), for any constant t   m( ) +  + 2 log(1/✏) + 1.
Proof:
Let Fˆi(·) := (Fi(·), i). If H1(x) = t   m( ) +   + 2 log(1/✏) + 1, by Lemma 1, we have
 [(s, Fˆi   Hs(x)), (s, Fˆi(U`( )))]  ✏. In addition, i is drawn uniformly from {0, 1} , and Fi is a
regular function; hence Fi(U`( )) ⌘ Um( ), and thus Fˆi   Hs(x) is statistically indistinguishable
from Um( ) ⇥ U . Therefore, weconclude that Ext (x, (i, s)) = (Fi   Hs(x), i) is a (t, ✏)-strong
extractor. In terms of the TCR property, we show that if there exists an adversary A who can break
the TCR of Ext , then we can build an adversary B who can break the TCR of F  as follows. B
is playing the UOWHF TCR game, meanwhile B interacts with A as the challenger in the strong
extractor TCR game. Up on A outputs x 2 {0, 1}`( ), then B randomly picks s 2 {0, 1}2·`( ) and
outputs xˆ := Hs(x) 2 {0, 1}`( ) to its challenger. Up on receiving i 2 {0, 1}  from its challenger, B
sends (i, s) to A. Up on A outputs x0 2 {0, 1}`( ), B outputs xˆ0 := Hs(x0) 2 {0, 1}`( ). SinceHs(·)
is a permutation, x 6= x0 implies Hs(x) 6= Hs(x0). Clearly, B’s probability of breaking UOWHF
TCR property is exactly equal to A’s probability of breaking strong extractor TCR property.
2
3.5.1 Dense Oneway Functions and Dense Puzzles from Complexity Assumptions.
We apply a TCR strong extractor for our construction. The key to the construction will be a “dense”
oneway function: a oneway function is ✏-dense oneway if its output distribution is at most ✏-far from
Um for some m 2 Z+. We now present a transformation of a one-way function to a dense one-way
function via the application of a TCR-strong extractor. The TCR property will ensure that any attempt
to invert the dense one-way function will result to an inversion of the underlying one-way function.
Formally we prove the following.
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Theorem 4 Let  1, 2 2 Z+ be the security parameters. Let   1 : X 1 7! Y 1 be an arbitrary
oneway function, and define H 1 = H1(  1(X)) for random variable X drawn uniformly from
X 1 . Assume there exists an efficient injective map ⇣ 1 : Y 1 7! {0, 1}`( 2). If
Ext 2(x, (s1, s2)) : {0, 1}`( 2) ⇥ {0, 1} 2+2·`( 2) 7! {0, 1}H 1 2 log(1/✏) 1
is a (H 1 , ✏)-TCR strong extractor, then
 U 1, 2(x, s1, s2) = (Ext 2(⇣ 1(  1(x)), (s1, s2)), s2)
is an ✏-dense oneway function with range {0, 1}2·`( 2)+H 1 2 log(1/✏) 1 and domainX 1⇥{0, 1} 2+2·`( 2).
Proof: The ✏-density of  U 1, 2 follows directly from the underlying (H 1 , ✏)-strong extractors, and
by Theorem 3,
 [(Ext 2(⇣ 1(  1(x)), (s1, s2)), s2), (UH 1 2 log(1/✏) 1, s2)]  ✏ .
We now show  U 1, 2 is oneway by reduction. Namely, if there exists an adversary A who can
break the onewayness of  U 1, 2 then we can construct an adversary B who can either break the
onewayness of   1 or break the TCR of Ext 2 . During the reduction, B plays the   1 oneway-
ness game with the environment C1 and the Ext 2 TCR game with the environment C2 simulta-
neously. B receives y =   1(x) for some x 2 X 1 from C1, and then B outputs ⇣ 1(y) to C2.
Upon receiving (s1, s2) 2 {0, 1} 2 ⇥ {0, 1}2·`( 2) from the environment C2, B sends A the im-
age  U 1, 2(x, (s1, s2)) = (Ext 2(⇣ 1(y), (s1, s2)), s2). A will then output (x0, (s01, s02)) 2 X 1 ⇥
{0, 1}2·`( 2), and B halts if (s1, s2) 6= (s01, s02), as A fails. Otherwise, if   1(x0) = y, B sends x0
to the environment C1; else B sends ⇣ 1(  1(x0)) to the environment C2. Since ⇣ 1 is injective,
  1(x
0) = y implies ⇣ 1(  1(x0)) = ⇣ 1(y); hence, if A wins, B can win either one of her games.
2
The above result paves the way for constructing dense puzzles from complexity assumptions.
Essentially, given a function with moderately hard characteristics making it suitable for a puzzle, it is
possible to transform it to a dense puzzle by applying a suitably hard TCR extractor (“suitable” here
means that breaking the TCR property should be harder than solving the puzzle). We now illustrate
this methodology by applying it to the discrete logarithm problem. More generally this methodology
transforms any puzzle in the sense of Definition 1 to a dense puzzle (assuming again a suitably hard
TCR extractor).
3.5.2 The DLP Based Puzzle and Calibrating Its Hardness.
Consider the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) as the candidate oneway function for our puzzle. Let
G = hGi be some (multiplicative) cyclic group where the DLP is hard, and G is a generator with
order p, which is a  1-bit prime. The oneway function  G : Zp 7! G is defined as  G(x) = Gx.
It is shown by Shoup [Sho97] that any probabilistic algorithm takes ⌦(pp) steps to solve the DLP
over generic groups. Analogously, [GJKY13] shows any probabilistic algorithm must take at leastp
2p✏ steps to solve DLP with probability ✏ in the generic group model. To build a puzzle, we would
like to calibrate the hardness of the DLP by revealing the most significant bits of the pre-image. For
22
Define PS  = {0, 1}7 /2+log
4  , SS  = {0, 1}log
4  , and HS  = [log4   + log2   + 1, log5  ]. For the
given  , select a pre-defined Ext  : {0, 1}  ⇥ {0, 1}3  7! {0, 1} +log
4  . Set the DLP  G : Zp 7! G
over the pre-defined elliptic curve, where p is  -bit prime such that there exists an efficient injective map
⇣ : G 7! {0, 1} . (We will omit this map ⇣ in the rest of the description for notation simplicity.)
• Sample(1 , h): Return puz $ {0, 1}7 /2+log4  .
• SampleSol(1 , h):
– Pick random s1
$ {0, 1} , s2 $ {0, 1}2 , x $ {0, 1}h and y $ {0, 1} /2.
– Return puz = (Ext ( G(x+ 2h · y), (s1, s2)), s2, y) and soln = x.
• Solve(1 , h, puz):
– Parse puz to (z, s1, s2, y); set soln = ? and initialize an empty set X .
– For ctr =
 
1, . . . , 2h
 
:
  Randomly pick x {0, 1}h \X , and add x to X .
  Set soln = x if z = Ext ( G(x+ 2h · y), (s1, s2)).
– Return soln.
• Verify(1 , h, puz, soln): Parse puz to (z, s1, s2, y). Return true if and only if z = Ext ( G(soln+2h ·
y), (s1, s2)).
Figure 4: The Dense Puzzle System From DLP.
example, for a puzzle with hardness factorh  b 1 12 c, we pick x 2 {0, 1}h and y 2 {0, 1}b( 1 1)/2c
uniformly at random, and set the puzzle as (Ext 2( G(x + 2h · y), (s1, s2)), s2, y). We assume the
calibrated DLP is still moderately hard with respect to the min-entropy of x. Note that a similar
assumption was used by Gennaro to construct a more efficient pseudo-random generator [Gen00]. It
is easy to see that this assumption holds for DLP in generic groups, i.e. given  G(x+ 2h · y) and y,
the best generic algorithm must take at least
p
2h+1✏ steps to solve DLP with probability ✏. We note
that this problem is closely related to leakage-resilient cryptography [AM11, ADVW13].
On the other hand, due to the out-layer extractor, we cannot directly adopt any known (generic)
DLP algorithms, such as [GTY07, GPR13]. Instead, our puzzle solver just exhaustively searches for
a valid solution. There is a subtle caveat, namely the expected running time of solving a puzzle with
hardness factorh, i.e. x $ {0, 1}h is designed to be 2h, whereas the TCR property of UOWHF is
only guaranteed against PPT adversaries with respect to  2 (the security parameter of the UOWHF).
To address this issue, we introduce an additional assumption, that is the expected running time of
any adversary A (in number of steps) can break the TCR property of the underlying UOWHF with
non-negligible probability on x $ {0, 1}h is !(2h/2), (i.e. breaking TCR is expected to happen
after the birthday paradox bound). The dense puzzle system from DLP (combining with TCR strong
extractors) is depicted in Figure 4.
Theorem 5 Let   2 Z+ be the security parameter and h 2 [log4   + log2   + 1, log5  ] be the
hardness factor. Let Ext  : {0, 1}  ⇥ {0, 1}3  7! {0, 1} +log
4   be a TCR strong extractor such
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that the expected running time of any adversary A that breaks its TCR property with non-negligible
probability on x  {0, 1}h is !(2h/2). Assume  G : Zp 7! G is a hard DLP in generic groups
such that the best generic algorithm must take at least
p
2h+1" steps to solve it with probability ".
The puzzle system PuzSys = (Sample, SampleSol, Solve,Verify) described in Figure 4 is correct,
complete with Solve’s running time 2h, efficiently samplable, statistically indistinguishable, and g-
hard, where g(T ) = T 1/c for any constant c > 2. In addition, for any k that is O(2log
3  ), PuzSys is
(id(·), k)-amortization resistant, where id(·) is the identity function.
Proof: Correctness and efficient samplability. Correctness and efficient samplability is straightfor-
ward.
Statistically indistinguishability. We now show that the puzzle system is statistically indistinguish-
able. Recall that puz consists of Ext ( G(x+2h ·y), (s1, s2)), s2, y, where s1, s2, y are chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random. Hence (s1, s2, y) is identically distributed toU ⇥U2 ⇥U /2.
Since H1(x) = h   log4   + log2   + 1 and  G is a bijective function, by Theorem 4, the
puz = (Ext ( G(x + 2h · y), (s1, s2)), s2, y) is at most ✏ = 2 (log2   1)/2 = negl( ) far from
U +log4   ⇥ U2  ⇥ U /2, where (s1, s2) $ {0, 1}3  and y $ {0, 1} /2 are drawn uniformly
random and independent to x. On the other hand, as shown in the paragraph below, the puzzle sys-
tem is complete. Notice that the solver is probabilistic, so Solve(1 , h, puz)) outputs a random soln
from the solution set of puz, which is identically distributed to the solution soln in (puz, soln)  
SampleSol(1 , h). Therefore,  [Ds, ,h, Dp, ,h] = negl( ) as claimed.
Completeness. Since the puzzle instance is statistically indistinguishable from uniform random, with
probability at most ✏ = 2 (log2   1)/2 = negl( ) a puzzle puz $ {0, 1}h is unsolvable; otherwise,
the Solve can be used to distinguish the puzzle instance from uniform random. It is easy to see that
the solver’s running time is 2h.
g-hardness. In terms of g-hardness, the adversary is able to read at most O(2log5  ) content of its
auxiliary tape z within its running time, whereas (s1, s2)
$ {0, 1}3  and y $ {0, 1} /2; therefore,
the probability that z contains a Ext ( G(x⇤ + 2h · y), (s1, s2)) query for some x⇤ is negligible in  .
In the rest case, recall that we assume breaking the TCR property of strong extractor is always harder
than solving the generic DLP. The best generic algorithm must take at least
p
2h+1" steps to solve a
hard generic DLP with probability ". Therefore, given 2h/c, c > 2, the adversary can successfully
solve the generic DLP with probability at most " = 2 (1 
2
c )h 1 = negl( ).
(⌧, k)-amortization resistance. Define the set of k sampled puzzles as puz1, . . . , puzk = (z1, y1),
. . . , (zk, yk). By the construction of the algorithm SampleSol, we have that the probability that all
y1, . . . , yk are distinct is
pd = 1 · (1  2  /2) · · · (1  (k   1)2  /2) > (1  k2  /2)k   1  k2 · 2  /2 = 1  negl( ).
Assume that k values y1, . . . , yk are distinct. As shown in [Yun15], the probability that an adver-
saryA can solve the k puzzles with less than⇥(
p
k · 2h) group operations is negligible. Hence, there
exists a constant↵ > 0 such that, with 1 negl( ) probability, we have StepsA(z, 1 , h, {puz1}ki=1)  
↵ · (k · 2h)1/2. Let ⌧(x) = x. When c > 2, k = O(2log 3 ) and h > log4  , we have for sufficiently
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large   2 N:
⌧
  kX
i=1
g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 
= k · 2h/c < ↵ · (k · 2h)1/2 .
Therefore, the probability that
StepsA(z, 1 , h, {puz1}ki=1)  ⌧
  kX
i=1
g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 
is negl( ).
2
Remark. For notation simplicity, we let the puzzle space “independent” of the hardness factor h,
therefore we have to limit hwithin a small interval to ensure (i)  G(x+2h ·y) has enough entropy and
(ii) it is infeasible to break the TCR property of the underlying UOWHFwithin 2h/2 steps. In practice,
for any desired h, we can always pick a suitable Ext  : {0, 1}  ⇥ {0, 1}3  7! {0, 1} +h log
2   1.
3.6 Instantiation of the Dense Puzzle Based PoWorK
We instantiate our PoWorK protocol as described in Figure 1 by building it upon the Schnorr identifi-
cation scheme [Sch89] and the dense puzzle system instantiation in the RO model6 (cf. Section 3.4).
For completeness, we provide a description of the Schnorr identification scheme in Figure 5. The
scheme is essentially a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm; let G be a group of prime order
q with generator g, and let Zq denote the field of integers modulo q. Schnorr’s identification scheme
works as follows:
Prover(q, g, x = gw) Verifier(q, g, x)
t
$ Zq, a = gt a       !
c         c
$ Zq
r = t+ cw mod q r       ! gr
?
= axc
Figure 5: The Schnorr identification scheme.
We denote our instantiation by ⇧⇤. We fix a security parameter   and a hardness factor h 2
[log2  , /4]. The challenge and puzzle spaces are all set to CS  = CS⇧ = PS  = {0, 1} . We
choose a random prime q s.t. 2   q. We select the parameters and the statement of the Schnorr
protocol to be (q, g, x = gw). We pick a hash functionH  : {0, 1}⇤  ! {0, 1} . The group operator
  is the bitwise XOR operation. The PoWorK protocol⇧⇤ consists of the two following stages:
1. Protocol execution: The two modes of⇧⇤ are:
6The construction using the DLP based puzzle system is similar. We chose to employ the RO instantiation for simplicity
in presentation.
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• PoK mode. 1st move: P(w) selects a random ⇢ in Zq and sends a˜ to V . 2nd move: V
sends a challenge c selected uniformly at random to P . 3rd move: P chooses random
s {0, 1}  and y  {0, 1} /2; it computes t = (LSB /2(H(s, y)), y) and c˜ = c  t. It
sends (c˜, r˜, s, t) to V , where r˜ = ⇢+ c˜w.
• PoW mode. 1st move: P runs (a˜, c˜, r˜) Sim⇧(x, c˜) and sends a˜ = g⇢ to V . 2nd move:
V sends a random challenge c to P . 3rd move: P computes t = ( c)   c˜ and runs
Solve(1 , h, t); if the puzzle solver outputs a value s, then P sends (c˜, r˜, s, t) to V , other-
wise it aborts the protocol.
2. Verification: The verifier checks that (1) c˜ = c  t; (2) gr˜ = a˜xc˜; (3) parses t as (t1, t2), where
t1, t2 2 {0, 1} /2 and checks that LSBh(t1) = LSBh(H(s, t2)).
We observe that since (a) the RO puzzle instantiation is correct and complete and (b) all spaces
are set to {0, 1} , ⇧⇤ achieves completeness. Moreover, the puzzle sampling distribution is close to
uniform {0, 1} , which is also the challenge distribution in ⇧⇤. Therefore, assumptions (A), (B) in
Figure 2 hold. In addition, the running time of the puzzle solver is 2h+2 log     2log2  +2 log   which
strongly dominates the linear time complexity of performing   operations or sampling uniformly at
random, i.e. assumption (C) in Figure 2 also holds. Thus, by Theorems 1 and 2, we have that ⇧⇤ is
⌫
p
(·)-sound, for any ⌫ > 2. The (statistical) indistinguishability of⇧⇤ is achieved by the perfect ZK
simulation of the Schnorr protocol and the assumptions (A), (B).
4 Applications
Below we present some practical and theoretical applications of our PoWorK.When using PoWorK in
practice we must ensure that the verifier cannot distinguish between the two types of provers based on
their response time. In Section 2.2 we argued that for our indistinguishability proofs, P(w) (i.e. the
prover who knows the witness) should perform some idle steps so that his running time will be lower
bounded by the time that one would need to solve the puzzle. However, enforcing a real user to wait
is not ideal. Luckily though, the time needed for a prover who solves a puzzle (i.e., does not know
the witness) depends on his total computational power and on whether the puzzle is parallelizable or
not. Provers who own specialized hardware (e.g., based on ASICs) or that have access to powerful
computer clusters (in case that a puzzle is parallelizable) might be able to solve the puzzle very fast
– paying of course the relevant computation cost. Thus, when applying PoWorK in practice, the
time that takes a prover to respond to a challenge is not a distinguishing factor: the prover might
have as well solved the puzzle in constant time by fully parallelizing its computation or alternatively,
for the case of non-interactive PoWorK’s the receiver may not know when the prover started proof
computation. Finally note that in any case, we do care that the prover has paid the corresponding
computational cost and he is not able to amortize a previous solution of a puzzle to solve a new one.
4.1 Email Spam Application
Using proofs of work to reduce the amount of spam email was suggested back in 1992 by Dwork and
Naor [DN92]. Their idea can be summarized in the following:
“If I don’t know you and you want to send me a message, then you must prove that you spent, say,
ten seconds of CPU time, just for me and just for this message” [DN92].
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In their proposal there exists some special software7 that operates on behalf of the receiver and checks
whether the sender has properly computed the proof of work or the sender is an approved (by the
receiver) contact. The reason that this approach helps to reduce spam is mainly economic: in order
for spammers to send high volumes of emails they would have to invest in powerful computational
resources which makes spamming non cost-effective.
A disadvantage of the method described above is that the list of the approved contacts (i.e. email
addresses) of the receiver has to be given to this special software/mail server in order to check whether
the sender belongs in this list or not - in which case she will have to perform additional computation.
This violates the privacy of the receiver who needs to reveal which of her contacts she considers to be
approved and thus allows them to send emails “for free”. Adopting our PoWorK protocol would give
a privacy preserving solution to the spam problem: given the indistinguishability feature of PoWorK,
the software/verifier does not need to know the approved list of contacts, in fact it does not even
need to know whether the incoming email is from an approved contact or a non-approved user who
successfully fulfilled the computational work.
Non-interactive PoWorKs. Sending an email should not require any extra communication between
the sender and the mail server. Our 3-move PoWorK is public-coin, thus can be turned into non-
interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86]. Namely, the prover, instead of receiv-
ing a challenge from the verifier, hashes the first move message a together with the context of the
email and the email address of the receiver into c, and provides the verifier with the whole proof, ⇡,
which includes (a, c, r) and the context of the email, in one round.
Multi-witness hard relation. In order for a user to approve a list of contacts she will have to provide
each one of them with a unique witness for the same statement (in order to ensure indistinguishabil-
ity). Let RL be a multi-witness hard relation with a trapdoor for a language {x | 9w : (x,w) 2 RL}.
A relation is said to be hard if for (x,w) 2 RL, a PPT adversary given x can only output w0 s.t.
(x,w0) 2 RL with negligible probability. A multi-witness hard relation with a trapdoor is de-
scribed by the following algorithms: (a) a trapdoor generation algorithm sets a pair of a statement
x and associated trapdoor t: (x, t)  GenT(RL), (b) an efficient algorithm GenW that on input
x 2 L and a trapdoor t outputs a witness w such that (x,w) 2 RL and, (c) a verification algorithm
1/0 Ver(RL, x, w) outputs 1 if (x,w) 2 RL and 0 otherwise 8.
PoWorK based spam reducing system. Consider a PoWorK scheme as presented in Figure 1 for
a security parameter  , a puzzle system PuzSys and a multi-witness hard relation with a trapdoor RL
as described above. A spam reducing system SRS consists of the following algorithms:
• MailServerSetup(1 ): the mail server Smail on input the security parameter,  , selects the hard-
ness of the puzzle system h 2 HS .
• ReceiverSetup(1 , h): user R (i.e. the receiver) runs (x, t)  GenT(RL and sends x and her
email address adR to the mail server (potentially signed together). The trapdoor t is secretly
7This special software could for example run on the receiver’s mail server or be an independent program running on the
receiver’s side.
8Examples of multi-witness hard relations with trapdoors are (a) the DL representation problem [Bra94, BF99] over
prime order groups, (b) the representation problem in composite modular groups [ACJT00] which has constant size param-
eters in the number of adversarial parties.
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stored byR.
• ApproveContact (t, x): in order forR to approve a sender S , it will run w  GenW(t, x) and
will give w 2 RL(x) to the sender (unique witnesses allow for revocation). From now on, S
can use w to send emails toR.
• SendEMail(w, h, x): a sender S with input the public parameters v, statement x 2 L and with
a private input w 2 RL(x)[ {?}, prepares a PoWorK proof ⇡ = (a, c, r). If S is an approved
contact of R, then she will use the witness w to perform the PoK side of PoWorK, while if R
is not an approved contact (i.e. w = ?) she will have to execute the PoW side. To compute
⇡ non-interactively she will fix c to be H(a,m), where a is the first message of PoWorK, m
stands for the body of the email9, andH is a hash. The rest of PoWorK is computed as before.
• ApproveEMail(h, x,⇡): is run by the mail server Smail who verifies ⇡ and outputs 0/1. If proof
is ⇡ valid, then Smail forwards the enclosed email toR.
Security. Although a formal definition and description of properties of an email system is out of
the scope of this paper, we do define and prove spam resistance and privacy. Briefly, spam resistance
guarantees that the mail server will allow an email message to reach the recipient if and only if a
valid proof (of work or knowledge) has been attached. At the same time for a non-approved contact
the number of valid proofs of work prepared should not affect the time required to prepare a new
one (similar to puzzle amortization property). Privacy implies that the mail server cannot distinguish
whether the sender of a message is an approved contact of the recipient or not.
Definition 6 Let SRS be a spam reducing system built upon a PoWorK (P,V) for a language L 2
NP and a puzzle system PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify). We define spam resistance and privacy
of SRS as follows:
(i). ( , k)-Spam Resistance: We say that SRS is ( , k)-spam resistant if there exists a PPT witness-
extraction algorithm K, such that for every hardness factor h 2 HS , auxiliary tape z 2
{0, 1}⇤ and every adversary A, if for non-negligible functions ↵1(·),↵2(·):
Pr
266664
(t, x) ReceiverSetup(1 , h); 81  i  k : puzi  Sample(1 , h);
{⇡i = (ai, ci, ri)}i2[k]  A(z, 1 , h, x) : 81  i  k : ApproveEMail(h, x,⇡i) = 1 ^
^(8i 6= j 2 [k] : ⇡i 6= ⇡j)^
^
⇣
StepsA(z, 1 , h, x)   
 Pk
i=1 StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi)
 ⌘
377775 = ↵1( ) ,
then Pr[KA(z, 1 , h, x) 2 RL(x)] = ↵2( ) .
(ii). Privacy: We say that SRS is private, if for every hardness factor h 2 HS , auxiliary tape
z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and every adversarial mail server A, it holds that:     Pr

(t, x) ReceiverSetup(1 , h);w  ApproveContact(t, x);
⇡  SendEMail(w, h, x) : A(z, h, x,⇡) = 1
 
 
  Pr

(t, x) ReceiverSetup(1 , h);
⇡  SendEMail(?, h, x) : A(z, h, x,⇡) = 1
        = negl( ) .
9We can assume that the email body also contains a time-stamp (or that the time-stamp is added later by the mail server)
and also includes (adS , adR) which are the sender/receiver email addresses
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We prove the following theorem for a private spam reducing email system:
Theorem 6 Let SRS be a spam reducing system built upon dense puzzle-based PoWorK (P,V) for
a g-hard and (⌧, k)-amortization resistant dense puzzle system PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify),
where k is polynomial in  , ⌧ is an increasing function and g is a subadditive function. Let H be
a hash function with output domain equal to challenge sampling space CS  modeled as a random
oracle. Assume that
(i). the worst-case running time of Solve(1 , ·, ·) is o(|CS |) and
(ii). (
p
⌧   g(Solve(1 , ·, ·)) is super-polynomial in  .
Then, the email system described above is private and (p⌧   g, k)-spam resistant.
Proof:
Spam Resistance. We start by constructing a knowledge extractorK which on input (z, 1 , h, x) and
given access to a prover A, uses the special soundness PPT extractor K⇧ of ⇧ to extract a witness.
Our K works similarly to the soundness extractor of PoWorK(cf. proof of Theorem 1), but can now
rewind A at any point and give it two different challenges ci, c0i (as it controls the random oracle), to
receive tuples (ai, ci, ri), and (a0i, c0i, r0i) on which it runs K⇧. Note that since K⇧ is a PPT algorithm,
K also runs in polynomial time.
Now assume that for some z 2 {0, 1}⇤, h 2 HS , there exists an adversary A and a non-
negligible function ↵1(·) s.t.
Pr
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(t, x) ReceiverSetup(1 , h); 81  i  k : puzi  Sample(1 , h);
{⇡i = ((ai, ci, ri)}i2[k]  A(z, 1 , h, x) : 81  i  k : ApproveEMail(h, x,⇡i) = 1  ^ (8i 6= j 2 [k] : ⇡i 6= ⇡j)
^
⇣
StepsA(z, 1 , h, x)  p⌧   g
 Pk
i=1 StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi)
 ⌘
37775 = ↵1( ).
By an averaging argument, there exist a statement x and and public parameters v s.t.
Pr
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81  i  k : puzi  Sample(1 , h);
{⇡i = ((ai, ci, ri)}i2[k]  A(z, 1 , h, x) : 81  i  k : ApproveEMail(h, x,⇡i) = 1  ^ (8i 6= j 2 [k] : ⇡i 6= ⇡j)
^
⇣
StepsA(z, 1 , h, x)  p⌧   g
 Pk
i=1 StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi)
 ⌘
37775   ↵1( ).
UsingA we will construct an algorithmW to break the (⌧, k)-amortization resistance of PuzSys.
We recall that in the non-interactive variant of our dense puzzle based PoWorK construction the
format of a proof ⇡ is (a, c, r) = (a˜, c, (c˜, r˜, puz, soln)).
W is given as input (x, v), 1 , h, {puz1, . . . , puzk}, where 81  i  k : puzi  Sample(1 , h).
ThenW , who also controls the random oracle, runs as follows:
1. Invoke A with input (1 , h, x).
2. For every i-th RO query of A ((a)i,mi) respond by a challenge ci which can be honestly
generated by asking H (thus, ci 2 CS  ). W stores all c1, . . . , ck0 in a table T along with the
corresponding query of A. Note that k0   k.
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3. Receive A’s output
⇡1, . . . ,⇡k = (a˜1, c1, (c˜1, r˜1, puz1, soln1)), . . . , (a˜k, ck, (c˜k, r˜k, puzk, solnk)) .
4. Look at the first proof ⇡1 ofA, locate the corresponding c1 in table T (let r be the row in which
found), and rewind A just before the point it made that query, i.e. at its r   1 query. With high
probability A will start making the same RO queries. For every query from 1 to r   1 return
the same c as before. However, when A makes its r-th query return cr = c˜1   puz1. For the
rest of the queries (from r + 1 and on) return a random challenge as in Step 2 and update table
T with the fresh values. When A outputs its second set of proofs ⇡(2)1 , . . . ,⇡(2)k 10 check that
puz1 is included in ⇡
(2)
1 and store the corresponding solution.
5. Proceed until all k solutions have been found, i.e. in the i-th rewind the new challenges are
c(i)1 , . . . , c
(i)
k0 , where c
(i)
i = c˜i   puz 1i , 8r < i : c(i)r = c(i 1)r and all the rest of the challenges
c(i)i+1, . . . , c
(i)
k0 are honestly sampled. When A outputs its i-th set of new proofs ⇡(i)1 , . . . ,⇡(i)k
check that the corresponding puzzle included in the proof ⇡(i)i is equal to puzi and store its
solution solni.
6. Output soln1, . . . , solnk.
We follow the reasoning of the proof of Theorem 1. For each rewinding i of A, when A received
honestly selected sequences c(i 1)1 , . . . , c
(i 1)
i 1 , c
(i 1)
i . . . , c
(i 1)
k0 in its i  1-th run and c(i)1 , . . . , c(i)i 1,
c(i)i . . . , c
(i)
k0 in its i-th run (where c
(i)
1 , . . . , c
(i) = c(i 1)1 , . . . , c
(i 1)
i 1 ), it outputs accepting transcripts
in no more than h
(
p
⌧   g)  kX
i=1
(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 i
steps and with probability ↵1( )2/4. Similar to the PoWorK soundness proof, we denote by Equali,
the event that this happens and c˜(i 1)i = c˜
(i)
i holds (again for each rewinding i). Obviously, either
Equali, or ¬Equali will occur with at least ↵1( )2/8 probability. We distinguish the following cases:
Case I. 8i 2 [k] : Pr[Equali]   ↵1( )2/8: in this case, as in the soundness proof of Theorem 1,
with probability ↵1( )2/8  negl( ) it holds that:
1. 8i 2 [k] : Verify(1 , h, puzi, solni) = true.
2. The running time ofW in number of steps is no more than
k ·
h
(
p
⌧   g)  kX
i=1
(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 i
.
10From now on the superscript x(·) denotes in which rewinding of A we are.
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Since k is polynomial we have that w.h.p. k  (p⌧   g) Pki=1(StepsSolve(1 , h, puzi)) . In addi-
tion, ⌧ is an increasing function and g is a subadditive function, hence we have that
k ·
h
(
p
⌧   g)  kX
i=1
(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 i  h(p⌧   g)  kX
i=1
(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
 i2 
 (⌧   g)  kX
i=1
(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi))
   ⌧  kX
i=1
g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puzi)).
Therefore,W breaks the (⌧, k)-amortization resistance property of PuzSys.
Case II. 9i⇤ 2 [k] : Pr[¬Equali⇤ ]   ↵1( )2/8: in this case, we set the knowledge extractor to
guess a priori an i 2 [k] to rewind A expecting to invoke K⇧ with two different challenges c˜ii = c˜i.
We stress that this setting is black-box and independent of A, thus consistent with the definition of
spam resistance. By the soundness property of ⇧, if K guesses i⇤ correctly, then it will return a
witness for x. Therefore, K is successfully returns a witness with at least ↵2( ) = ↵1( )2/(8k)
probability.
Privacy. Let h 2 HS , z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and an adversary A that breaks SRC privacy with non-negligible
advantage ↵( ). By an averaging argument, there exist a statement x, a witness w 2 RL(x) and
public parameters v s.t.  Pr[⇡  SendEMail(w, h, x) : A(z, h, x,⇡) = 1] 
  Pr[⇡  SendEMail(?, h, x) : A(z, h, x,⇡) = 1]     ↵( ).
Given A we construct an adversary B against PoWorK statistical indistinguishability that on input a
statement x, auxiliary input z, h and a PoWorK proof ⇡ (i.e. the view of B either in PoK mode on
witness w or PoW mode), invokesA on input (z, h, x,⇡) and returnsA’s output. It is straightforward
that B distinguishes the mode of the PoWorK prover with advantage ↵( ).
2
Intuitively, the privacy holds because of the indistinguishability of PoWorK . The (p⌧   g, k)-
spam resistance property holds because of the soundness of PoWorK and the amortization resistance
of the underlying PuzSys.
4.1.1 Spam Email Extensions
Similar to [DN92, DGN03], our spam reducing application requires to implement additional protocols
between the sender and the recipient (i.e. a change in the internet mail standards would be required).
In this subsection, we discuss some interesting extensions of our protocol that address revocation,
prevention of witness sharing and solving “useful” puzzles.
Revocation. We could possibly use standard anonymous revocation schemes [CL02, LPY12] on
top of our email construction. The idea is similar to group signatures authorization: whenever a
receiver approves a user (i.e. adds the user to the group of approved contacts) she also provides her
with a membership credential. The receiver has to periodically update a public list of revoked (or
unrevoked) users and, whenever a sender wishes to send an email, she will also have to include a
proof of non-revocation together with ⇡ (which can be done anonymously to preserve the privacy
against the mail server).
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Preventing witness sharing (transferability). Another possible extension would be to guarantee
that a user/receiver is not sharing her witness with more users. A possible way to address this problem
is to use the techniques that were proposed by Kiayias and Tang [KT13] and construct a leakage-
deterring cryptographic function F that on input a user’s witness it outputs some private information
associated with it. Whenever a user obtains a witness, this is associated with some private information
of the user (e.g.. a credit card number). F is constructed in such a way that when it receives w as
input, outputs the information associated to it. Thus, when a malicious user shares his unique witness,
anyone who receives it can find the user’s private information.
Performing useful work. It would be very appealing if the computational power consumed by a
PoW user to solve a puzzle, was actually used towards some sort of useful work. A possible idea
would be to use a volunteer computing service, for instance, the Berkeley BOINC system http:
//boinc.berkeley.edu/ that contributes to scientific research, as a work provider, WP , that
generates the puzzles to be solved. Then, one could use our Lapidot-Shamir based PoWorK that
requests that the PoK prover solves a puzzle selected by the verifier (cf. Appendix A). The verifier
can pick a random puzzle from the work provider, WP , and once the prover has the solution can
submit it back toWP . Assuming that the verifier and the work provider are not colluding, the privacy
of the prover is maintained.
4.2 PoWorK-based Cryptocurrencies
Proofs of work is the basic primitive used in achieving the type of distributed consensus required in
cryptocurrencies, notably Bitcoin [Nak08] and many others that use the same approach. The main
idea is that a proof of work operation can be used to calibrate the ability of parties to build a hash
chain that contains transaction records, commonly referred to as the blockchain.
An important feature of a blockchain is its decentralized nature. Given the view of a participant
(commonly referred to as a miner) that includes its view of the blockchain, a fresh instance of a puzzle
of a specified difficulty is created (which itself may depend on the blockchain) and has to be solved
in order to add another block in the chain. Formally, the operation of a PoW-based miner as used in
Bitcoin and numerous other cryptocurrencies (such as Litecoin, Namecoin, Dogecoin) is as shown in
Figure 6.
Under certain assumptions about the network synchronicity and the hardness of the proof, the
above mechanism has been shown to be robust in the sense of satisfying two properties, persistence
(transactions remain stable in the “ledger”) and liveness (all transactions are eventually inserted in the
ledger) assuming that the honest parties are above majority [GKL15]. Puzzle-based cryptocurrencies
have also drawn a lot of criticism due to the fact that they require a lot of natural resources (e.g., in
[OM14] it is reported that Bitcoin mining in 2014 already consumed as much energy as the needs of
the country of Ireland for electricity).
This lead to the development of a number of systems that circumvent puzzles (including, [DM16,
BLMR14, Maz15] as well as Peercoin, DasHCoin, NXT, Nushares, ACHCoin, Faircoin and oth-
ers). These systems maintain a blockchain as well, however they rely on a different mechanisms for
producing blocks. We call them, generically, “knowledge-based cryptocurrencies” since the produc-
tion of a block is associated with the production of a witness for a public-relation relation R which
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Let hB1, . . . , Bni be the current blockchain where Bi is a tuple (ti, Ti, ui,⇡i) with ti a time-stamp, Ti a set
of transactions, ui = H(Bi 1) (for a hash function H) and ⇡i is such that Verify(1 , hi, H(Bi),⇡i) = true.
The hardness hi is calculated via a function operating on the time-stamps as follows hi = HC(t1, . . . , ti 1).
A new block Bn+1 is created as follows.
1. Collect transactions into a vector Tn+1.
2. Calculate hn+1 = HC(t1, . . . , tn).
3. Set puz = H(tn+1, Tn+1) where tn+1 is a current timestamp and run Solve(1 , h, puz) to produce a
soln = ⇡n+1.
4. If the above step is successful, broadcast Bn+1 = (tn+1, Tn+1, un+1,⇡n+1).
Figure 6: Miner operation in a puzzle-based cryptocurrency (using a puzzle PuzSys =
(Sample, Solve,Verify) that is dense). HC(·) is the puzzle hardness calculation function which de-
pends on the timestamps of the blocks of the current blockchain.
parameterizes the system. Formally, we present the miner11 operation in Figure 7.
Let hB1, . . . , Bni be the current blockchain where Bi is a tuple (ti, Ti, ui,⇡i), for ti, Ti, ui defined as in
Figure 6 and ⇡i being a NIZK that shows xi 2 {x | 9w : (x,w) 2 R}, where xi = V (B1, . . . , Bi 1, ti, Ti)
for i = 1, . . . , n. The miner, equipped with secret-key sk, produces the next block as follows.
1. Collect transactions into a vector Tn+1.
2. Calculate the pair (xn+1, aux)  V (B1, . . . , Bn, tn+1, Tn+1) where tn+1 is the current time. Then
calculateWsk(xn+1, aux) = wn+1. If wn+1 6= ? it holds that (xn+1, wn+1) 2 R.
3. If the above step is successful, compute a NIZK proof ⇡n+1 for xn+1 using witness wn+1.
4. Broadcast Bn+1 = (tn+1, Tn+1, un+1,⇡n+1).
Figure 7: Miner operation in a knowledge-based cryptocurrency parameterized by relation R. The
function V (·), given the blockchain information, the current set of transactions and the time-stamp
produces a statement x, while the function Wsk(·) given a statement produces a witness w so that
(x,w) 2 R.
A trivial way to construct a knowledge-based cryptocurrency would be to have a a single trusted
authority with a public and secret key pair, (pk, sk), acting as the sole miner.12 At a time-step n+ 1,
the function V (·) would set simply xn+1 = (tn+1, Tn+1, un+1) and Wsk(xn+1) would produce a
signature on xn+1 that would serve as ⇡n+1 (there is no need for a NIZK). Another example of a
knowledge-based cryptocurrency is NXT. On a high level, in this system each miner (called forger)
has a digital signature public and secret key, (pk, sk), associated with her account. The function
V (B1, . . . , Bn, tn+1, Tn+1) (run by each miner), operates as follows: it parses Tn+1 to recover the
public pk of the miner (note that it is always present in the transaction collecting the fees). Then, based
11Note that we use the term “miner” for symmetry. Miners are associated with puzzle based cryptocurrencies and thus
different terminology has been introduced in knowledge-based systems including “mintettes”, “forgers” and others.
12For instance, this would be a single “mintette” instantiation of [DM16].
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Let hB1, . . . , Bni be the current blockchain where Bi is a tuple (ti, Ti, ui,⇡i), for ti, Ti, ui defined as
in Figure 6 and ⇡i being a non-interactive PoWorKthat demonstrates either the solution of the puzzle
puz = H(ti, Ti) with hardness hi = R(t1, . . . , ti 1) or that xi 2 {x | 9w : (x,w) 2 R} where
xi = V (B1, . . . , Bi 1, ti, Ti).
1. Collect transactions into a vector Tn+1.
2. If a secret-key sk is available, perform steps 2-3 of Figure 7 and follow the PoK direction of
PoWorK(cf. Figure 1), using the H(·) to compute the challenge of the verifier.
3. Else, perform steps 2-3 of Figure 6 and follow the PoW direction of PoWorK(cf. Figure 1) using the
H(·) to compute the challenge of the verifier.
4. Broadcast Bn+1 = (tn+1, Tn+1, un+1,⇡n+1).
Figure 8: Miner operation in a PoWorK-based cryptocurrency parameterized by relation R and
PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify). The functions V (·),Wsk(·) are as in Figure 6 and the function
C(·) is as in Figure 7.
on the public-key pk and the blockchain B1, . . . , Bn it determines how much currency is associated
with the account that corresponds to the public-key pk; this results in a time-window d 2 R+ whose
expectation is proportionate to the amount of currency in the account (the more currency, the shorter
the expectation of d is; we omit the exact dependency in this high level description). The function
V (·) returns (xn+1, aux) with xn+1 = (tn+1, Tn+1, un) and aux = d. The procedureWsk(xn+1, d),
will produce a signature w on the message (tn+1, Tn+1, un) if tn+1   tn + d; else, it produces ?.
Note that in this system no NIZK is employed, one may just set ⇡n+1 = w; however, the system
would operate similarly if a NIZK was employed to establish knowledge of a signature w on the
message (tn+1, Tn+1, un).
We now show how to construct a PoWorK-based cryptocurrency derived from a knowledge-based
cryptocurrency C1 and a puzzle-based cryptocurrency C2 for a dense puzzle in Figure 8. The construc-
tion is straightforward: a new block can be added to the blockchain by someone who can efficiently
compute a proof ⇡i using some secret key or by someone who is computing a ⇡i by performing
computational work.
The properties of the composition are informally stated in the following (meta)-theorem; the
proof of the theorem follows from the properties of PoWorK and is similar in spirit to the proof of
Theorem 6. The formal statement and proof of the theorem (that should also include a formalization
of all relevant underlying properties of cryptocurrencies, both in the puzzle-based and knowledge-
based setting, e.g., in the sense of [GKL15]) is out of scope for the present exposition.
Theorem 7 (informally stated) The cryptocurrency C of Figure 8 is the composition of a knowledge-
based cryptocurrency C1 and a puzzle-based cryptocurrency C2 so that (i) the population of miners of
C1, C2 becomes a single set that is indistinguishable to any adversary that controls a subset of miners
of C, (ii) the persistence property of C is upheld as long as the conditions for persistence of C1, C2
hold in conjunction. (iii) the liveness property of C is upheld as long as the conditions for liveness of
C1, C2 hold in disjunction.
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4.3 PoWorKs as 3-move Straight-line Concurrent Simulatable Arguments of Knowl-
edge
In this section, we present a theoretical application of PoWorKs. Namely, we show that any PoWorK pro-
tocol that satisfies a couple of reasonable assumptions, implies straight-line concurrent ( poly(log  ))-
simulatable arguments of knowledge. Our application is based on the results of [Pas03, Pas04] In
these results, Pass has shown that protocols satisfying straight-line simulatability are also straight-line
concurrent simulatable. More specifically, it is shown that protocols satisfying straight-line strong
T ( )-simulatability (where T ( ) is a class of functions closed under composition with any polyno-
mial) are also concurrent T ( )-strongly simulatable. Given this proof, we conclude that our 3-move
dense puzzle based PoWorK construction, when instantiated with an appropriate puzzle system, is a
3-move straight-line concurrent  poly(log  )- statistically simulatable argument of knowledge.
We start by recalling the straight-line T ( )-simulatability definitions introduced in [Pas03, Pas04].
Definition 7 ([Pas04]) Let T ( ) be a class of functions that is closed under composition with any
polynomial. We say that an interactive argument (P,V) for the language L 2 NP with witness
relation RL, is straight-line strongly T ( )-simulatable, if for every probabilistic verifier V ⇤ with
running time bounded by T ( ), there exists a probabilistic simulator S with running time bounded
by T ( ) such that the following two ensembles are strongly T ( )-indistinguishable:
(i). {viewV⇤  hP(w)$ V⇤i(x, z)}x2L, w2RL(x),z2{0,1}⇤
(ii). {hS $ V⇤i(x, z)}x2L,z2{0,1}⇤
That is, for every probabilistic algorithmD running in time T (·) in the length of its first input, all
sufficiently long x 2 L, all w 2 RL(x) and all auxiliary inputs z, z0 2 {0, 1}⇤, it holds that
|Pr[D(x, z0, viewV⇤  hP(w)$ V⇤i(x, z)) = 1]  Pr[D(x, z0, S(x, z)) = 1]| < 1
T (|x|) .
The notion of perfect (resp. statistical) T ( )-simulatability is defined similarly, by requiring
that the two ensembles in Definition 7 are identically (resp, statistically close distributed) for every
(computationally unbounded) verifier V ⇤. The notion above could be further restricted to guarantee
security under concurrent executions. Pass in [Pas04] provides the following definition.
Definition 8 ([Pas04]) Let T ( ) be a class of functions that is closed under composition with any
polynomial. We say that an interactive argument (P,V) for the language L 2 NP with witness
relation RL, is straight-line concurrent T ( )-simulatable, if for every PPT oracle machine A that is
not allowed to restart of rewind the oracle it has access to, and every polynomial p( ), there exists
a probabilistic simulator S(i, x) with running time bounded by T ( ) such that the following two
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
(i).
n
AP (x1,w1),··· ,P (xp( ),wp( ))(z, x1, . . . , xp( ))
o
z2{0,1}⇤,x1,...,xp( )2L,{wi2RL(xi)}[p( )]
(ii).
n
AS(1,w1),··· ,S(p( ),wgp ))(z, x1, . . . , xp( ))
o
z2{0,1}⇤,x1,...,xp( )2L
The concurrent self-composition Lemma in [Pas04] states that protocols which are straight-line
strongly T ( )-simulatable (resp. perfectly simulatable) are also straight-line concurrent strongly
T ( )-simulatable (resp. perfectly simulatable). In the Lemma below, we also consider the case of
statistical T ( )-simulatability.
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Lemma 2 (Concurrent Self-Composition [Pas04]) Let T ( ) be a class of functions closed under
composition with any polynomial, and let (P,V) be an interactive argument of knowledge with
efficient provers13. If (P,V) is straight-line strongly (resp. statistically) (resp. perfectly) T ( )-
simulatable, then it is also straight-line concurrent strongly (resp. statistically) (resp. perfectly)
T ( )-simulatable.
In the following theorem, we apply Lemma 2 to prove that any 3-move PoWorK is straight-line
concurrent statistically  poly(log  )-simulatable argument of knowledge, when two additional time
complexity assumptions hold. These assumptions are plausible and can be easily met by our dense
puzzle based construction when built upon both of our puzzle instantiations, for an appropriate choice
of hardness factor.
Theorem 8 Let L be a language in NP and let PuzSys be a puzzle system. Let (P,V) be a 3-move
f -sound PoWorK for L and PuzSys with statistical indistinguishability such that for every hardness
factor h 2 HS , it holds that:
(i). Pr[puz Sample(1 , h) : f(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))   log  ] = negl( ).
(ii). The worst-case running time of Solve(1 , h, ·) is  poly(log  ) and P is a polynomial time algo-
rithm that makes oracle calls to Solve(1 , h, ·).
Then, (P,V) is a 3-move straight-line concurrent statistically  poly(log  )-simulatable argument of
knowledge.
Proof:First, we show that (P,V) is a 3-move straight-line statistically  poly(log  )-simulatable argu-
ment of knowledge. Namely, that (P,V) satisfies the following properties:
Completeness. Follows directly from the completeness of (P,V).
Argument of Knowledge. Consider the PPT witness-extraction algorithm K as in the f -soundness
of (P,V). Assume that for some x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ) , y 2 {0, 1}⇤, z 2 {0, 1}⇤ and hardness factor
h 2 HS  there exists a PPT prover P⇤ and a non-negligible function s(·) s.t
Pr[outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : outV = accept]   s( ).
Since the PPT prover P⇤ runs in o  log    time and by assumption (i) of the statement of the theorem,
we have that for some negligible function  (·)
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h); outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : (outV = accept
 
^ StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h))  f(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))]   s( )   ( ).
Since s( )   ( ) is a non-negligible function, by the f -soundness of (P,V), the algorithm K, given
oracle access to P⇤, returns a witness for x with some non-negligible probability.
Straight-line  poly(log  )-statistical simulatability. Let V⇤ be an arbitrary verifier. We construct a
simulator S that runs in  poly(log  ) time, such that the distributions
{viewV⇤  hP(w)$ V⇤i(x, z, h)}x2L, w2RL(x),z2{0,1}⇤,h2HS  and
{viewV⇤  hS $ V⇤i(x, z, h)}x2L,z2{0,1}⇤,h2HS 
13I.e., PPT provers that satisfy completeness.
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are statistically indistinguishable. Namely, S encompasses the prover P and the puzzle solving al-
gorithm Solve and emulates the PoW mode of (P,V). By assumption (ii) in the statement of the
theorem, P runs in polynomial time and makes oracle calls to Solve with worst case complexity
 poly(log  ). Since the complexity class  poly(log  ) is closed under polynomial composition, the run-
ning time of S is bounded by p( ) ·  poly(log  ) =  poly(log  ), where p(·) is some polynomial. By the
construction of S , the distributions
{viewV⇤  hS $ V⇤i(x, z, h)}x2L,z2{0,1}⇤,h2HS  andn
viewV⇤  hPSolve(1 ,h,·) $ V⇤i(x, z, h)
o
x2L,z2{0,1}⇤,h2HS 
⌘ DV⇤PoW
are identical. Thus, the straight-line  poly(log  )-statistical simulatability follows from the statistical
indistinguishability of (P,V).
By applying the concurrent self-composition Lemma 2, we conclude that (P,V) is a 3-move
straight-line concurrent statistically  poly(log  )-simulatable argument of knowledge for language L.
2
Remark. In practice, we can instantiate the dense puzzle with a DL function over a dense elliptic
curve [BHKL13] (without the need of an extractor). This means that we can transform a 3-move
proof/argument of knowledge to a concurrent one with minimal computational overhead – 1 expo-
nentiation for the prover and 1 exponentiation for the verifier. (cf. Fig. 1(a).) Note that a similar result
in terms of rounds and with similar assumptions (i.e. DL) can be obtained via the efficient OR com-
position with an input-delayed ⌃-protocol as recently observed in [CPS+16], however the resulting
complexity overhead would be at least 3 exponentiations for the prover and 2 exponentiations for the
verifier when the underlying Chameleon ⌃-protocol is instantiated from Schnorr’s protocol.
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A The Lapidot-Shamir Based PoWorK Construction
In this section, we describe our second PoWorK construction which is less efficient than the dense-
puzzle based construction but can be constructed from any arbitrary puzzle system14. We stress
that this construction is not black-box on the puzzle verification algorithm and does not retain the
public-coin aspect (since the verifier will be sending an actual puzzle in the second move) without
any additional assumption about the puzzle system. In Section A.1, we provide a detailed description
of the Lapidot-Shamir (LS) protocol and the properties it satisfies. In Section A.2, we present a 3-
move protocol that compiles any 3-move special sound and computationally auxiliary input special
HVZK (sHVZK) protocol (like the LS protocol) into a PoWorK that, as we prove in Section A.3, is
⇥(g)-sound and computationally indistinguishable, where g is the hardness scaling function of the
underlying puzzle system.
A.1 The Lapidot-Shamir SS -sHVZK protocol
We recap the 3-move Lapidot-Shamir (LS) special sound computational auxiliary input sHVZK pro-
tocol [LS90] in this section. The LS protocol is an SS-sHVZK protocol (cf. Subsection 3.1) for
Hamiltonian Cycle, and thus it can support any NP language. In the LS protocol, the prover only
needs to know the size of the statement in order to produce the first move, while the actual statement
is only needed for the third move. This property is crucial for our construction. In the following de-
scription, we run `( ) instances of the original LS protocol in a parallel. Denote P1LS ,P2LS ,VerLS
as the first move prover, third move prover and the verification algorithm respectively. The common
input of the prover and verifier is a graph G with N vertices, represented by its adjacency matrix. In
addition, the prover takes a Hamiltonian cycle of G (denoted as C) as its private input.
• P1LS(N): For i 2 {1, 2, . . . , `( )}, do:
– Pick a random cycle Ri with N vertices.
– Commit to every element of the adjacency matrix of Ri, denoted as Com(Ri), using a
statistically binding commitment scheme.
• P1LS ! VerLS : Com(R1), . . . ,Com(R`( ))
• P2LS  VerLS : c = c1 · · · c`( ) $ {0, 1}`( )
• P2LS(G, c): For i 2 {1, 2, . . . , `( )}, do:
– If ci = 0, then define zi as the openings of the entire committed adjacency matrix,
Com(Ri).
– IF ci = 1, then define zi as (⇡i, di), where ⇡i is a permutation from the vertices of Ri
to the vertices of G and di is the openings of all adjacency matrix elements of Ri that
correspond to non-edges of G.
• P2LS ! VerLS : z1, . . . , z`( ).
14The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the possibility of using this approach for constructing
PoWorKs.
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• VerLS
⇣
G, {Com(Ri)}i2[`( )] , c, {zi}i2[`( )]
⌘
: return 1 if and only if for every i 2 {1, 2, . . . , `( )}:
– if ci = 0, all the openings of the commitments verify and the openings of Com(Ri) form
indeed a random cycle.
– if ci = 1, the openings of all adjacency matrix elements of Ri that correspond to non-
edges of G are 0 (i.e. Ri is a subgraph of G up to permutation).
Properties of the LS protocol.
• Special soundness: Given two accepting transcripts with c 6= c0, there exists a knowledge
extractor that can output a Hamiltonian cycle of G. Indeed, if c 6= c0, then 9i 2 [`( )] s.t.
ci 6= c0i. Therefore, from the i-th instance, we obtain (i) the random cycle Ri when ci = 0 and
(ii) the permutation that maps Ri to the actual Hamiltonian cycle C of G when c0i = 1.
• Auxiliary input sHVZK: There exists a simulator SimLS = (Sim1LS , Sim2LS) s.t. for any
challenge c, SimLS can simulate a transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from the
real one. Observe that the LS protocol achieves this property, for any auxiliary input because
in each execution, the prover sends a fresh commitment key in the first move. Therefore, the
verifier has negligible probability of gaining significant information about the table of messages
and corresponding commitments by reading a polynomial size part of the auxiliary input. Fi-
nally, the sHVZK is computational, as an unbounded algorithm may break the hiding property
of the statistically binding scheme.
• First move independence: The selection of R and the commitments to the elements of its
adjacency matrix are performed independently of G and C. We emphasize that Sim1LS can
simulate the first move without knowing the statement as well, namely it commits to a random
cycle if ci = 0; commits to a zero adjacency matrix if ci = 1.
A.2 The Lapidot-Shamir Based Compiler.
The compiler is designed with black-box access to any 3-move special sound auxiliary input sHVZK
protocol⇧ for some language L 2 NP . W.l.o.g., the challenge sampling distribution of⇧ is uniform
in the challenge space. The properties of the LS protocol imply that there exists such a protocol for
every language in NP . Let P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧, and Sim⇧ be the first move prover, third move prover,
verification algorithms, and simulator of ⇧, respectively. The challenge space of (P,V), ⇧ and the
LS protocol coincide and are set as {0, 1}`( ,h), where `(·, ·) is a function that depends on   and the
hardness factor h, so that the size of the challenge space is superpolynomial in  .
Let SimLS be the simulator of the aforementioned LS protocol. Here, we need to exploit the
feature that SimLS can simulate the first move without knowing the statement, i.e. it commits to
either a random cycle or a zero matrix depending on the challenge bit. Hence, we denote SimLS =
(Sim1LS , Sim2LS) such that (a, st)  Sim1LS(c,N) and r  Sim2LS(G, c, st), where G is the
statement of size N , c is the challenge and st is the simulator’s state. For fixed security parameter  
and hardness factor h, we define the language
L ,h =
n
t 2 PS  | 9s 2 HS  : Verify(1 , h, t, s) = true
o
.
We reduce L ,h to the Hamiltonian Cycle via the generic deterministic algorithms G and C that will
encode a statement (puzzle) t and a witness (solution) s 2 RL ,h(t) to a graph Gt and a hamiltonian
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cycle Hs of Gt respectively. Note that the size of Gt, N ,h depends only on  , h, which enables the
application of the first move of LS protocol before receiving the puzzle statement at the second move
of our construction.
The protocol (P,V) can be executed in either of the two following modes:
1. Proof of Knowledge (PoK) mode. P has a witness w 2 RL(x) as private input. In order to
prove knowledge of w to V , in the first move, P follows the first move of ⇧ and simulates the
first move of the LS protocol by providing Sim1LS with a random challenge c. The verifier
responds with a challenge cˆ and a sampled puzzle puz. Then, P executes the third move of ⇧
by running P2⇧ with the challenge c˜ = cˆ  c and simulates the third move of the LS protocol.
2. Proof of Work (PoW) mode. P has no private input and convinces V by “working” for at least
some expected amount of time. To achieve this, P simulates an execution of ⇧ with a sampled
challenge c˜ and follows the first move of the LS protocol. Then, it receives (cˆ, puz) from V
as before and runs the puzzle solver to obtain a solution soln of puz, which encodes as a cycle
Csoln of the graphGpuz. Finally, it proves the knowledge of soln via reduction to the third move
of the LS protocol with challenge c = cˆ 1   c˜.
As in the dense puzzle based construction, the verification mechanism must be the same for both
modes. Namely, the verifier computes the encodingGpuz of the challenge puzzle puz and checks that:
(i) the relation c˜ = cˆ  c holds, (ii) the ⇧-protocol’s transcript is accepting and (iii) the LS protocol’s
transcript for statement Gpuz is accepting. The protocol (P,V) is presented in detail in Figure 9.
A.3 Security of the Lapidot-Shamir PoWorK Construction
We denote by CInv : Hamiltonian Cycle  ! SS  the inverse of the cycle encoding algorithm C that
decodes an encoded witness (solution of a puzzle-statement). The algorithm CInv is deterministic and
runs in polynomial time. In addition, we denote byKLS the PPT witness extractor of the LS protocol.
As in Section 3 (Figure 2 Assumption (C)), we assume that the running time of Solve dominates the
running time of all algorithms associated with the construction.
Theorem 9 Let L be a language in NP and let ⇧ = (P1⇧,P2⇧,Ver⇧) be a special sound 3-move
computational auxiliary input sHVZK protocol for L, where the challenge sampling distribution is
uniform. Let PuzSys = (Sample, Solve,Verify) be a puzzle system that satisfies g-hardness for some
function g. Define (P,V) as the protocol described in Figure 9 when built upon ⇧ and PuzSys.
Assume that there exists a constant  < 1 and a negligible function ✏(·) s.t. for every hardness
factor h 2 HS :
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h) :  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) >
> 2 · StepsChSampler(1 , h) + StepsKLS (tr ,h, tr0 ,h) + StepsCInv(1 , h)]   1  ✏( ),
where CInv is the inverse of the cycle encoding algorithm C and KLS is the witness extractor for the
LS protocol on input two protocol transcripts tr ,h, tr0 ,h. Then, (P,V) is a
 
(1   )/2  · g-sound
PoWorK for L and PuzSys with computational indistinguishability.
Proof:
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Statement: x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ).
Prover’s private input: w 2 RL(x).
P : • pick c $ {0, 1}`( ,h);
• (a, st) Sim1LS(c,N ,h);
• (a˜, ⇧) P1⇧(x,w);
P ! V: a, a˜.
V: • pick cˆ $ {0, 1}`( ,h);
• puz Sample(1 , h);
P  V: cˆ, puz.
P : • c˜ = cˆ  c;
• Gpuz  G(1 , h, puz);
• r˜  P2⇧( ⇧, c˜, x, w);
• r  Sim2LS(Gpuz, c, st);
P ! V: c, c˜, r, r˜.
Verification:
1. c˜ = cˆ  c.
2. Ver⇧(x, a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1.
3. VerLS(1 ,G(1 , h, puz), a, c, r) = 1.
(a) Knowing the witness (PoK)
Statement: x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ).
Prover’s private input:  
P : • pick c˜ $ {0, 1}`( ,h);
• (a, LS) P1LS(N ,h);
• (a˜, c˜, r˜) Sim⇧(c˜);
P ! V: a, a˜.
V: • pick cˆ $ {0, 1}`( ,h);
• puz Sample(1 , h);
P  V: cˆ, puz.
P : • c = cˆ 1   c˜;
• soln Solve(1 , h, puz);
• Gpuz  G(1 , h, puz);
• Csoln  C(1 , h, soln);
• r  P2LS( LS , c, Gpuz, Csoln);
P ! V: c, c˜, r, r˜.
Verification:
1. c˜ = cˆ  c.
2. Ver⇧(x, a˜, c˜, r˜) = 1.
3. VerLS(1 ,G(1 , h, puz), a, c, r) = 1.
(b) Doing work (PoW)
Figure 9: The LS PoWorK construction for fixed security parameter   and hardness factor h 2 HS ,
given a 3-move-SS-sHVZK protocol ⇧ for language L, an LS protocol and a puzzle system PuzSys;
the challenge space of (P,V), ⇧ and the LS protocol coincide and are set as {0, 1}`( ,h);  ⇧,  LS
and st are states of the prover of⇧, the prover of the LS protocol and the simulator of the LS protocol,
respectively.
Completeness. By the completeness of PuzSys, we have that with overwhelming probability, soln, as
computed in the PoW mode of (P,V), is a solution of the sampled puz, i.e. soln 2 RL ,h(puz). This
implies that with overwhelming probability, the reduction of L ,h to the Hamiltonian Cycle maps
(puz, soln) to a graphGpuz that has Csoln as hamiltonian cycle. Moreover, the completeness of the LS
and ⇧ protocols implies that the simulated transcripts in both PoK and PoW mode of (P,V) must be
accepting with overwhelming probability. Therefore, verification will be accepting with overwhelm-
ing probability for any honest execution of (P,V). 
(1   )/2  · g-Soundness. First, we make use of the special soundness PPT extractor K⇧ of ⇧
to construct a PPT knowledge extractor K that on input (x, y, z) and given the code of an arbitrary
prover Pˆ , executes the following steps:
1. K samples (honestly) a puzzle, puz and two challenges, cˆ1, cˆ2.
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2. Using standard rewinding,K(x, y, z, h) interacts with Pˆ(y) by submitting the challenges (cˆ1, puz),
(cˆ2, puz). It receives two protocol transcripts from Pˆ , denoted as h(a, a˜), (cˆ1, puz), (c1, c˜1, r1, r˜1)i
and h(a, a˜), (cˆ2, puz), (c2, c˜2, r2, r˜2)i.
3. It runs the witness extractor K⇧ of the protocol ⇧ on input (x, ha˜, c˜1, r˜1i, ha˜, c˜2, r˜2i).
4. It returns the output of K⇧.
Assume that for some x 2 {0, 1}poly( ), y 2 {0, 1}⇤, z 2 {0, 1}⇤, h 2 HS , there exists a prover P⇤
and a non-negligible function s(·) s.t
Pr[puz Sample(1 , h); outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : (outV = accept
 
^ StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h)) 
 
(1  )/2  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))]   s( ).
We will prove that
 
(1   )/2  · g-soundness of (P,V) is satisfied, unless we can use P⇤ to
construct an algorithmW that breaks the g-hardness of PuzSys.
Let Y ✓ P  be the set of puzzles, such that when the challenge (cˆ, puz) of V satisfies puz 2 Y ,
then
Pr[outV  hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h) : (outV = accept
 
^ StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, h)) 
 
(1  )/2  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz))]   s( )/2.
By the assumption for P⇤ and a standard counting argument, we have that Pr[puz 2 Y ]   s( )/2.
Suppose that we perform rewinding on P⇤, by fixing the same puzzle puz in the verifier’s chal-
lenge. Let h(a, a˜), (cˆ1, puz), (c1, c˜1, r1, r˜1)i and h(a, a˜), (cˆ2, puz), (c2, c˜2, r2, r˜2)i be the two protocol
transcripts. If puz 2 Y , then by the splitting Lemma, both transcripts are accepting with at least
(s( )/4)2 = s( )2/16 probability.
The challenge space of (P,V) (i.e. the challenge space of ⇧) has superpolynomial size, so the
probability that the two uniformly sampled challenges cˆ1, cˆ2 are equal is no more than some negligible
function  ( ). If the verification for both transcripts is accepting and cˆ1 6= cˆ2, then it holds that
(c˜1 = cˆ1   c1) ^ (c˜2 = cˆ2   c2) ^ (cˆ1 6= cˆ2)) (c1 6= c2) _ (c˜1 6= c˜2). (6)
Let D be the event that P⇤, when rewinded as above, outputs two accepting transcripts and
cˆ1 6= cˆ2, c1 6= c2 occur. Let D˜ be the event that P⇤, when rewinded as above, outputs two ac-
cepting transcripts and cˆ1 6= cˆ2, c˜1 6= c˜2 occur. By the assumption for P⇤ and eq. (6), we have
that if puz 2 Y , then one of the probabilities Pr[D|puz 2 Y ], Pr[D˜|puz 2 Y ] must be at least
s( )2/32   ( ). We analyze both cases:
I. Pr[D|puz 2 Y ]   s( )2/32   ( ) holds. In this case, we can construct an algorithmW that
breaks the g-hardness of PuzSys. The input thatW receives is (1 , (x, y, z), h, puz), where (x, y, z)
is the auxiliary input and puz is sampled from algorithm Sample(1 , h). Then,W works as follows:
1. It invokes P⇤ for statement x, private input y and auxiliary input z.
2. Using standard rewinding, W interacts with P⇤(y) with two challenges (cˆ1, puz), (cˆ2, puz),
where cˆ1, cˆ2 are uniformly sampled from {0, 1}`( ,h). It receives two transcripts, h(a, a˜), (cˆ1, puz),
(c1, c˜1, r1, r˜1)i and h(a, a˜), (cˆ2, puz), (c2, c˜2, r2, r˜2)i.
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3. It runs the witness extractor KLS of the LS protocol on input (Gpuz, ha1, c1, r1i, ha2, c2, r2i).
It receives an output C from KLS .
4. It runs the inverse of the cycle encoding algorithm C, CInv on input C and receives a value
soln 2 SS .
5. It returns soln.
By definition of Y and D and the special soundness property of the LS protocol, we have that if
puz 2 Y and D occurs, thenW’s output soln is verified, i.e. Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = true. By the
previous analysis, the probability that the latter happens is at least
Pr[(puz 2 Y ) ^D]   s( )
2
· s( )
2
32
   ( )   s( )
3
64
   ( ).
By the assumption in the statement of the theorem and the assumption for P⇤, there is a constant
 < 1 s.t. the probability that Verify(1 , h, puz, soln) = true and
StepsW(x, y, z, 1 , h, puz) 
 2 · StepsP⇤(hP⇤(y)$ Vi(x, z, 1 , h)) + 2 · (StepsSample(1 , h, puz))+
+ StepsKLS ((Gpuz, a1, c1, r1), (Gpuz, a2, c2, r2)) + StepsCInv(1
 , h, C) 
 2 (1  )/2  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) +  · g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) =
= g(StepsSolve(1
 , h, puz))
i.e., the running time of W in number of steps is bounded by g(StepsSolve(1 , h, puz)) is at least
s( )3/64  ( )  ✏( ) which is a non-negligible function. Therefore, for auxiliary tape (x, y, z) and
hardness factor h, W breaks the g-hardness of PuzSys, which contradicts to the security of the said
puzzle system.
II. Pr[D˜|puz 2 Y ]   s( )2/32   ( ) holds. In this case, we have that c˜1 6= c˜2. By the special
soundness property of ⇧, when the knowledge extractor K invokes K⇧ on two accepting transcripts
with two different challenges, it will return a witness for x. Define q( ) = s( )3/64    ( ). The
probability that K extracts a witness is at least
Pr[D˜] = Pr[puz 2 Y ] · Pr[D˜|puz 2 Y ]   q( ).
Thus, we conclude that our protocol is (
 
(1  )/2  · g)-sound.
Computational indistinguishability. We will show that (P,V) is computationally indistinguishable,
if ⇧ and the LS protocol achieve HVZK for any auxiliary input z 2 {0, 1}⇤. To do this, we will make
use of a “hybrid” protocol (P˜,V) where the prover P˜ follows both underlying protocols, ⇧ and LS,
of (P,V) and the verifier V behaves as before. For fixed  , h, the description of (P˜,V) is as follows:
Statement: x 2 L \ {0, 1}poly( ).
Prover’s private input: w 2 RL(x).
First move: P˜ samples a random challenge c and executes (a˜, ⇧)  P1⇧(x,w), (a, LS)  
P1LS(N ,h). It sends a, a˜ to V .
Second move: V samples a pair c, puz and sends it to P˜ .
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Third move: P˜ computes c˜ = cˆ   c. It runs Solve(1 , h, puz) and receives a solution soln. Then, it
encodes puz and soln as Gpuz and Csoln respectively. Finally, it executes r˜  P2⇧( ⇧, c˜, x, w) and
r  P2LS( LS , c, Gpuz, Csoln) and sends r, r˜ to V .
Verification: as in the (P,V) protocol.
Let V⇤ be a PPT verifier. W.l.o.g., we assume that V⇤ returns a single bit. Let D˜V⇤ be the dis-
tribution determined by the view of V⇤ when interacting with P . We will show that the distributions
DV⇤PoK , D
V⇤
PoW determined by the view of V⇤ when interacting with P in the PoK and PoW mode
of (P,V⇤) are computationally indistinguishable because (I)DV⇤PoK , D˜ are computationally indistin-
guishable and (II)DV⇤PoW , D˜
V⇤ are computationally indistinguishable.
I.DV⇤PoK , D˜
V⇤ are computationally indistinguishable. We observe that in the PoKmode of (P,V⇤)
and (P˜,V⇤) the values c, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜ are identically distributed. So, for every statement x 2 L, aux-
iliary input z 2 {0, 1}⇤, and hardness factor h  Pr[V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1]
(c,a,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r,r˜) DV⇤PoK
  Pr[V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1]
(c,a,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r,r˜) D˜V⇤
   =
=
X
(c,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r˜)
Pr[c, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜]·
·
⇣
Pr[(a, st) Sim1LS(c,N ,h); r  Sim2LS(Gpuz, c, st);
V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1 | c, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜] 
  Pr[(a, LS) P1LS(N ,h); r  P2LS( LS , c, Gpuz, Csoln);
V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1 | c, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜]
⌘
.
(7)
By the computational auxiliary input sHVZK property of the LS protocol, we have that for any chal-
lenge c and auxiliary input (z, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜), the PPT verifier V⇤ cannot distinguish between the
actual and the simulated view of the LS protocol. Therefore, by eq. (7), we have that for some
negligible function  (·),  Pr[V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1]
(c,a,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r,r˜) DV⇤PoK
  Pr[V⇤(x, z, h, c, a, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r, r˜) = 1]
(c,a,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r,r˜) D˜V⇤
   

X
(c,a˜,cˆ,puz,c˜,r˜)
Pr[c, a˜, cˆ, puz, c˜, r˜] ·  ( ) =  ( ).
II.DV⇤PoW , D˜
V⇤ are computationally indistinguishable. When running in the PoWmode of (P,V⇤),
the challenge c for the LS protocol is computed by the group operation of a value cˆ provided by V⇤ and
a value c uniformly sampled from {0, 1}`( ,h). Thus, in the PoWmode of (P,V⇤), c follows the same
(uniform) distribution that c follows in (P˜,V⇤). This implies that the distribution of c, a, cˆ, puz, c˜, r
in the PoW mode of (P,V⇤) is identical with the distribution in (P˜,V⇤). We continue as in case I in a
“symmetric” way, i.e. we now show the computational indistinguishability ofDV⇤PoW , D˜
V⇤ by taking
advantage of the computational auxiliary input sHVZK property of ⇧.
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